

# When are Junctures Critical? The Legacies and Non-Legacies of the Suppression of Local Self-Government

(Working Paper\*)

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## Abstract

The suppression of local self-government is a common feature of imperial rule and centralized authoritarianism. Extant scholarship considers such interventions to be *potentially* legacy-producing. But under which circumstances do these denials of political autonomy lead to sustained changes in political behavior? We develop a novel framework that elucidates when suppression of local self-rule will or will not produce political legacies. Two factors are crucial: the duration of an intervention and the scope of repression. Enduring interventions characterized by encompassing repression are the most likely to generate persistent changes. Contrariwise, transient episodes characterized by limited repressiveness are unlikely to produce legacies. Given our theory's broad character, we conduct empirical analyses in two markedly different settings: Poland, which was split between three major empires, and Brazil, where a military regime installed appointed mayors in certain cities. Our results demonstrate that the suppression of local self-government has varying potential to create legacies.

\* Working Paper. Comments are welcome.

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# Introduction

Can contemporary support for illiberal political forces—such as anti-system parties and authoritarian successor parties (ASPs)—be traced to historical events? A growing literature in political economy responds in the affirmative. The central insight of this work is that political institutions and values evolve *jointly* over time and are complementary to one another (Besley and Persson, 2019; Bisin, Rubin, Seror and Verdier, 2023; Persson and Tabellini, 2021; Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni, 2013).<sup>1</sup> This implies that institutional frameworks and political behavior can be mutually reinforcing (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci, 2017; Charasz, 2022). Consequently, plausibly exogenous shocks—such as external interventions—that impose changes in regime type can have long-lasting effects on the values and behavior of members of society (Aaskoven, 2022a). From the perspective of critical juncture scholarship, these changes may be viewed as aspects of new, self-reinforcing equilibria (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007).<sup>2</sup> At the local level, regime shifts that suppress self-government can take place because of either imperialism (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017; Guardado, 2023) or centralized authoritarian rule (Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg, 2018).

Interventions of this kind may generate patterns of socialization and behavioral adjustment that conform with the character of the imposed regime, producing greater numbers

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<sup>1</sup>Related scholarship notes that in order for major institutional changes to last, they need to be supported by the (updated) preferences of key political groups or coalitions (Saylor and Wheeler, 2017).

<sup>2</sup>Comparable self-reinforcing patterns have been identified with respect to demography and public service provision (Pardelli and Kustov, 2022) as well as elite political behavior and property rights regimes (Mangonnet, 2023). A more critical perspective on the issue is provided by Aaskoven (2022b).

of citizens with authoritarian mindsets in a society once dominated by democrats and vice versa (Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2021). Accordingly, instances of externally imposed institutional change may constitute critical junctures that kickstart path-dependent feedback loops between initial institutions and political culture. Thus, to understand contemporary support for or rejection of antidemocratic actors, it is imperative to identify pivotal historical experiences associated with lasting cultural and institutional change.

Yet when an externally imposed change in regime type constitutes a critical juncture, and when it does not, is not at all obvious *ex ante*. The US-led post-World War II reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan—characterized by the external imposition of democracy—clearly represented critical junctures in that they catalyzed the establishment of democratic political cultures in societies where authoritarian values were previously dominant (Haddad, 2012; Puaca, 2009). On the other hand, recent US-led reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which also featured the crafting of domestic institutions by external actors, have not had similar effects (Coburn and Larson, 2014; Waldner, 2009). So while the existence of a complementarity between democratic institutions and values points to the *possibility* that external interventions might generate lasting legacies for political behavior, understanding whether or not they are likely to do so in any particular instance requires further theoretical and empirical analysis.

This article develops a novel argument about when the suppression of self-government will lead to sustained changes in attitudes and behavior. It emphasizes two factors: the duration of suppression (“transient” or “enduring”) and the character of repression (“limited” or “encompassing”). Episodes of suppression that are enduring and characterized by encompassing repression, restricting myriad aspects of political life and subjecting the populace to

state violence, are the most likely to generate persistent changes in political behavior. Contrariwise, episodes of suppression that are transient and characterized by narrowly targeted repression are the least likely to produce legacies.

Given our theory's broad applicability, we illustrate the utility of our approach via empirical analyses of interventions in two markedly different settings: Poland, which was historically split between three empires, and Brazil, where a military regime externally installed appointed mayors in a large number of cities. In the former case, we show that the long-lasting and highly coercive rule of Russia generated a cultural preference for illiberal political actors, manifested in the present day by support for the authoritarian-populist Law and Justice party (PiS). With respect to Brazil, we show that the relatively transient and narrower repression implemented by the military regime failed to generate lasting political preferences in favor of illiberal authoritarian successor parties. In both cases, we bring to bear contextual knowledge and leverage geographic variation in historical interventions and the outcomes of local elections to infer the existence (or non-existence) of legacies.

In elucidating why external interventions may or may not produce legacies, we deepen the literature on “historical persistence,” a body of scholarship that locates its causal variables in the (often distant) past and its outcomes in the present day or more recent past.<sup>3</sup> Extant studies in this literature typically exploit spatial variation within a single country or region to demonstrate that a particular historical event has had a lasting legacy. While this research strategy illuminates historical dynamics in particular cases, it provides limited insight into

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<sup>3</sup>Comprehensive reviews of this literature are provided in [Abad and Maurer \(2021\)](#), [Acharya, Blackwell and Sen \(2023\)](#), [Cirone and Pepinsky \(2022\)](#), [Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg \(2018\)](#), and [Voth \(2021\)](#). For an overview that focuses on colonial legacies in particular, see [De Juan and Pierskalla \(2017\)](#).

when and why legacies take hold, since published persistence studies are almost exclusively stories of “success” (i.e., instantiated legacies).

In contrast, our agenda here is to: (1) demonstrate empirically that events in a similar class (e.g., the suppression of local self-government) which could plausibly constitute the basis of a legacy do not always do so, and; (2) explain why some events in the class generate legacies while others do not.<sup>4</sup> To this end, we develop a novel template for the *comparative* investigation of the establishment of legacies, one that combines a comparative case study approach at the macro-level (leveraging cross-case variation) with design-based causal inference at the micro-level (leveraging within-case variation). Such a template has the virtue of taking seriously admonitions in the literature on comparative historical analysis about the need to incorporate negative cases in research on legacies (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007), while at the same time subjecting assessments of the existence of legacies to contemporary standards for causal inference (Dunning, 2012; Morgan and Winship, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, our paper’s use of this specific template represents one of the very first explicit attempts to foster knowledge accumulation in historical political economy by integrating design-based inference with the comparative method (Callis, Dunning and Tuñón, 2023).

We also seek to enrich scholarship on historical junctures. Analytically, we consider episodes of suppression to be instances of such junctures, which may or may not prove to be critical (i.e. legacy-inducing) based upon their duration and repressiveness. By treating

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<sup>4</sup>In taking this step, we respond to mounting disquiet among historically oriented social scientists about the absence of attention given to failed or non-existent legacies of past events that could have plausibly constituted a legacy (Abad and Maurer, 2021; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2023; Collier, 2022; Voth, 2021).

these features of historical junctures as variables that take on distinct values across cases, we position ourselves to conduct a counterfactual analysis of the juncture-legacy relationship (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Soifer, 2012). As such, we further understanding of when “hypothesized” (Boas, 2022), “potential” (Handlin, 2022), or “possible” (Kaufman, 2022) critical junctures may become *actual* critical junctures.<sup>5</sup> The novelty of our approach lies in the combination of a theoretical framework that carefully delineates expectations about the characteristics of junctures that do or do not produce legacies and an empirical framework that uses a principled transnational comparison to execute an exacting empirical test of those expectations.<sup>6</sup>

The remainder of our study is organized as follows. First, we introduce our theoretical framework, differentiating between types of interventions that are more or less likely to generate lasting legacies for political behavior. Subsequently, we justify our selection of cases and characterize the nature of external intervention in each instance. In our empirical analysis, we provide evidence that episodes of the suppression of local self-government led to a lasting legacy of pro-authoritarian voting behavior in Poland but not in Brazil. In the

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<sup>5</sup>Since duration is a variable in our analysis, we self-consciously depart from treatments of historical junctures that define such episodes as taking place during narrow time periods or generally being short in length relative to the legacies they (may) produce. Commitment to such a definition would imply that the study of potentially long-lasting phenomena such as colonialism, forced labor regimes, communism, and the suppression of self-government—all core topics in historically oriented scholarship in political science—is outside the bounds of historical juncture research.

<sup>6</sup>On the use of transnational comparisons in comparative politics—which combine subnational and cross-national analyses—see Sellers (2019). For a call for greater rigor in hypothesis testing in historical juncture research, see Waldner (2022).

conclusion, we summarize our insights and explain how our approach can be applied to the genesis of legacies in other contexts.

## When does the Suppression of Local Self-Government Create Legacies?

The suppression of local self-government materializes in a wide variety of forms. It may occur after foreign conquest, as when a colonizing power installs officials from the metropole to directly administer a conquered territory (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2017). It may also be the consequence of conflict dynamics internal to a nation-state, as in post-civil war settings when a victor installs overseers to rule over the territories of vanquished foes (Liu, 2022). More quotidianly, it often occurs in the wake of transitions from democratic to authoritarian rule, as when newly empowered authoritarian elites eliminate or abridge the capacity of particular communities to select their local political officials.

For our purposes in this paper, we define episodes of the “suppression of self-government” as *interventions* executed by either an imperial power or a centralized authoritarian regime that significantly reduce or eliminate entirely the capacity of local populations to select their political officeholders. This may occur in tandem with state violence targeted at proponents of ideas or actions hostile to the regime responsible for the intervention. So defined, the suppression of self-government is conceptually distinct from instances of (locally determined) authoritarianism, where local actors decide of their own accord to adopt exclusionary political practices.

Studies of the suppression of self-government feature prominently in scholarship on histor-



ical legacies, albeit with debate about the nature and direction of relevant effects. Analyses examining contemporary differences across Italian regions suggest that extended experiences with self-government are relevant for outcomes such as civic engagement (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, 121–162), the belief that one’s actions can meaningfully shape life prospects (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2016), and economic development (Di Liberto and Sideri, 2015). Research on local interventions ties autocratic and imperial interventions to persistent anti-democratic attitudes and poor governance outcomes in countries including Chile (González, Muñoz and Prem, 2021), Indonesia (Martinez-Bravo, 2014; Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee and Stegmann, 2017), Romania (Vogler, 2023), and Vietnam (Dell, Lane and Querubin, 2018). Similarly, scholarship on lived experiences with communism links the suppression of self-government to attitudes hostile to democracy (Besley and Persson, 2019; Neundorff, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017).<sup>7</sup>

Yet other literatures imply that the link between experiences with self-government and democratic values and behavior is more complex. Scholarship on colonialism and imperial rule reports legacies of self-governance that often point in contradictory directions.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, research on foreign military intervention implies that externally imposed changes in

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<sup>7</sup>Vice versa, Doucette (2024) finds that positive historical experiences with self-government institutions lead to higher levels of support for democratic parties in the long run.

<sup>8</sup>Some studies link direct colonial rule and/or longer exposure to colonial rule, both of which imply weaker local self-governance, to positive long-run outcomes such as enhanced prospects for democracy (Hariri, 2012; Lange, 2004), less corruption (Lange, 2004), and stronger norms of cooperation (Chaudhary, Rubin, Iyer and Shrivastava, 2020). Others tie indirect rule and/or colonial neglect, both of which imply stronger local self-governance, to improved public good provision (Iyer, 2010) and higher levels of economic development (Mahoney, 2010).

regime type do not inherently foster the development of either democratic or non-democratic institutions (De Mesquita and Downs, 2006; Downes and Montén, 2013).

These heterogeneous findings beg an important question: When is the suppression of self-government likely to generate legacies for political behavior? Our claim is that the suppression of self-government is more or less likely to produce legacies for political behavior depending on its (1) duration and (2) the scope of repression. Given the specific class of historical events that we consider here (“suppression of local self-government”), these two features are crucial for legacy formation because they influence the types of political skills citizens adopt and, even more importantly, the values parents bequeath to their children. It is the joint action of skill adoption and intergenerational value transmission—induced by the specific characteristics of the intervention itself—which determines the likelihood that an episode of suppression will come to shape behaviors such as voting for anti-democratic actors.

Consider first the duration of a suppression of self-government. Duration matters because it shapes perceptions among the populace about the intervention’s long-term time horizon. For individuals living in a territory subject to intervention, each additional year that passes under external rule increases perceptions of the solidity of the regime.<sup>9</sup> As citizens in the intervened community come to perceive the state of suppression as more likely to persist throughout their professional lives, many will begin to invest in political skills that allow them to succeed in their new environment. Such skills are forms of expertise or learned

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<sup>9</sup>This can be rationalized as a result of a Bayesian learning process, where individuals have uncertainty about regime stability but (positively) update their beliefs based on the time elapsed under the current system (e.g., Hill, 2017).

capabilities—consciously adopted—that are tailored to the specifics of the regime created by the intervention. For instance, investing in one’s capacity to be an ideological thought leader and in cultivating ties to ruling party factions may be central to professional advancement and personal well-being in a system characterized by the absence of self-rule (Egorov and Sonin, 2011; Liu, 2019; Shih, Adolph and Liu, 2012). Because of the fixed costs of such skills investments, individuals who adopt regime-specific skills during the intervention are likely, once the intervention ends, to support political actors who are either directly linked to the now-defunct regime (such as ASPs) or who seek to create an environment favorable to those with authoritarian predilections (such as anti-system parties).

The duration of an intervention is also relevant for parental decisions about the socialization of children, a process that plays a critical role in the formation of political preferences (e.g., Beck and Jennings, 1991; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer, 2021). If self-rule is perceived as unlikely to reemerge in the foreseeable future, many parents will instill outlooks and orientations that maximize their children’s ability to achieve social (and economic) success in the new (more authoritarian) institutional environment. Extolling the virtues of popular deliberation and principled dissent, for example, would hinder their children’s ability to navigate social, economic, or political groups that are critical under the current regime; better, in this context, to inculcate a pride in obedience to authority and satisfaction with political disengagement. On the other hand, if self-government is expected to reemerge shortly, then maintaining the old value system would be preferable.

Accordingly, longer episodes of suppression, which convince many parents that the absence of self-government today will likely continue on indefinitely, incentivize the transmission of authoritarian-compatible values. Shorter episodes, which tend to leave open the possi-

bility of a reversion to the old order, incentivize the transmission of values compatible with self-rule. Consequently, the greater the longevity of an episode of the suppression of self-government, the more likely it will be that a critical mass of citizens manifests a preference for anti-democratic political actors in the post-intervention period.

Of course, value change via parental socialization is a slow-moving process. At any given time, it takes place only within households that have children in an impressionable age range—roughly, late childhood through adolescence (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). Multiple waves of children in this range need to be socialized before a meaningful aggregate shift in values can take place. A timespan of roughly a human generation is a plausible lower threshold in which this could occur. Accordingly, we categorize episodes of suppression shorter than a human generation (roughly thirty years) as *transient*, and longer episodes as *enduring*. All else equal, we expect durable values shifts to be more likely to result from the latter than the former.<sup>10</sup>

Now consider the scope of repression. This concept can be meaningfully split into two subcomponents: (1) Involvement of (broad parts) of the citizenry in governance processes through the provision of limited channels of formal participation (especially elections of officials, such as members of the legislature); and (2) violent suppression of ideas and actions

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<sup>10</sup>In line with our discussion, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017, 296–307) also consider the potential importance of regime duration for attitudinal legacies. However, they concentrate on detecting differences in the intensity of the legacies of communism in post-communist countries, a set of cases for which regime duration was fairly extensive across the board (i.e., multigenerational). By contrast, we consider instances of the suppression of self-government that vary qualitatively in terms of duration in order to maximize leverage in assessing the relevance of the transient/enduring distinction for legacy formation.

that are hostile toward the authoritarian regime or imperial power. Episodes of suppression of self-government have varied markedly across time and place on both these aspects of repression, although cases which feature more expansive opportunities for political participation tend to feature lower levels of violent suppression (and vice versa) (Blakeley, 2012; Corduneanu-Huci and Osa, 2003).

So defined, the scope of repression matters for two reasons. First, it determines the regime-specificity of political skills. The greater the number of arenas for participation and/or the less intense violent suppression during the episode of suppression, the greater the opportunities for citizens to take advantage of previously acquired skills related to self-government. By the same token, the greater the continuity in the set of relevant political elites, the less need citizens will feel to develop new talents or invest in new social networks. Encompassing repression incentivizes large aggregate changes in political skills, whereas limited repression reduces the extent to which an intervention will lead to skill changes. Since political skills investments drive regime preferences, more extensive repression during the episode of suppression should be associated with stronger preferences for anti-democratic political actors in the post-intervention period.

Second, scope matters because it determines the degree of mismatch between values that produce self-fulfillment under self-government and the realities of life under external intervention. Episodes of suppression that are characterized by limited repression, which offer real, albeit abridged, opportunities for political participation, present a smaller mismatch than do episodes characterized by encompassing repression. Consequently, parents may find it attractive to bequeath democratic values to their children when repression is limited, as they anticipate their offspring may at least experience some true opportunities for partici-

pation in the arenas of politics that remain open. By the same token, violent suppression of anti-regime ideas and actions creates incentives for parents to teach their children authoritarian/populist values, as doing so makes it less likely that their offspring will be subjected to state violence. In sum, because democratic values are more likely to be sustained via parental socialization during episodes of suppression featuring limited repression, voting for anti-democratic actors in the post-intervention period should be more muted in these cases than for interventions characterized by encompassing repression.

Importantly, neither aspect of our theoretical framework (length or depth) requires *all* citizens of an affected polity to change their own political skills or the way they raise their children. Our argument is simply that these two features of interventions lead to gradual changes in beliefs and behavior among an incrementally increasing number of citizens. As long as the length or depth of an episode of suppression keeps encouraging a growing proportion of the citizenry to adapt to the new institutional environment, the materialization of a legacy becomes more likely. Once a critical mass has been socialized in this way, a long-term change to the political behavioral equilibrium is achieved. In other words, a legacy has been instantiated.

Figure 1: When does the suppression of self-government create legacies for pro-authoritarian voting behavior?

	Limited Repression	Encompassing Repression
Transient Intervention	<i>Minimal</i> potential for long-term legacies	Moderate potential for long- term legacies
Enduring Intervention	Moderate potential for long- term legacies	<i>Highest</i> potential for long-term legacies

Our argument is summarized by [Figure 1](#). A suppression of self-government that is both enduring and characterized by encompassing repression has the greatest potential to generate a legacy for voting behavior, as we expect considerable shifts in political skills and values. In contrast, a suppression that is transient and which has a limited scope of repression has the least potential to generate a legacy, as neither political skills nor values are likely to shift much. Imperial or authoritarian interventions that are either (1) enduring but limited in their scope of repression or (2) transient but encompassing in their repression represent intermediate cases. Legacies may possibly emerge in these cases, but they will typically have a high “decay rate” ([Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2023](#)).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>The off-diagonal cases may produce lasting legacies if one of the two dimensions we highlight takes on an extreme value. For instance, interventions which are transient but characterized by extreme levels of repression could produce rapid adoption of regime compatible skills and beliefs (e.g., [Homola, Pereira and Tavits, 2020](#)). Of course, the fact that legacies may emerge in such cases does not per se contradict our argument that legacies are *most likely* to emerge when duration and repression are both high, and *least likely*

# The Cases: Suppression of Self-Government in Poland and Brazil

We illustrate our argument through the analysis of (1) the imperial partition of Poland and (2) centralized military rule in Brazil. We selected these cases for three reasons. First, it is reasonable to characterize the suppression of local self-government in both cases as potentially legacy-inducing events. Indeed, the literature on imperialism would suggest a high likelihood of a legacy in Poland (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Vogler, 2019), whereas the literature on authoritarianism regimes would suggest a high likelihood of a legacy in Brazil (González, Muñoz and Prem, 2021; Martínez-Bravo, 2014).<sup>12</sup> Second, there is variation *across the cases* in the features of the types of suppression specified by our framework as driving the likelihood of a legacy (i.e., the cases exhibit a theoretically relevant contrast). Third, *within the cases* there is internal spatial variation in the presence and/or nature of suppression that permits one to establish the existence or non-existence of a legacy using the tools of design-based causal inference.

In each of the two cases, we carefully chose the period in which we conducted our empirical examination. First of all, our theory is about electoral behavior in open elections, implying that we can only consider episodes after imperialism or authoritarianism in which open elections are permitted.

Additionally, our key guiding principle was to establish hard-test conditions with respect to both Poland and Brazil. As our theoretical claim is that enduring and repressive episodes

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to emerge when they are both low.

<sup>12</sup>On the latter point, see Kitschelt and Singer (2018) for a discussion of how party-voter linkage strategies are shaped by past authoritarian interventions.



of suppression of self-government (such as in the case of Russia) are most likely to produce a stable long-term legacy, in the case of Poland we evaluate our empirical predictions using outcomes with a significant temporal distance from the original intervention. This represents a hard-test condition because in any examination in the period immediately following an intervention, patterns of (authoritarian) political behavior may exhibit a degree of stickiness before moving to a non-authoritarian equilibrium. To avoid the detection of such short-term legacies with a high decay rate, we resort to an analysis of Poland after the Cold War.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, in the appendix (section A.3), we explain our choice of the 2010s as the most appropriate time within the post-Cold War period.

Vice versa, when the suppression of local self-government is both short in duration and limited in repression, we predict that there will no legacy at all. Under such circumstances, an empirical test immediately following the intervention represents hard-test conditions because if there is (even just minimal) stickiness in authoritarian behavioral patterns, such an analysis in the immediate aftermath of the intervention would likely detect it and provide evidence *against* our theory. Accordingly, in the case of Brazil, we examine the first two elections following centralized authoritarian rule.

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<sup>13</sup>An alternative strategy would be to focus on elections in Interwar Poland. Yet, in addition to departing from hard-test conditions, this would be inappropriate for our purposes for two reasons. First, the legal and administrative frameworks imposed by the three powers persisted for years after Poland had formally gained independence (Tarnowska, 2012; Tarnowska, 2013; Vogler, 2019), making impossible to disentangle institutional effects from patterns of political behavior. Second, the Polish party system of the interwar period was geographically highly fragmented, with different parties present across the former partitions (Sokolowski, 2013). Thus, direct comparisons of electoral success across different areas are often unavailable.

## Characterizing the Episodes of Suppression

### Poland

In Poland, different areas of the country are associated with varying prospects for legacies based on the characteristics of past imperial rule. Major European powers began to partition the Polish lands in the late eighteenth century. In 1815, after the Napoleonic Wars, Poland's fate was again decided by multiple empires: At the Congress of Vienna, the territories inhabited by the Poles were split between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. These partitions lasted until Polish independence in 1918.<sup>14</sup>

The duration of the suppression of self-government was long lasting by any criterion: 123 years if dated to the third partition (1795) and 103 years if dated to the fourth (1815). This represented sufficient time for Poles living under foreign occupation to adapt their practices and attitudes in response to the character of intervention, be it through a shift in political skills, political values, or both. However, while the intervention's duration was (roughly) constant across the three territories, the scope of repression differed markedly.

The scope of repression was most encompassing under Russian rule. Russia governed its Polish territories in a top-down fashion, using a high level of state coercion and precluding opportunities for meaningful or broad political participation (Davies, 2005, ch. 2; Vogler, 2019, 814–815). Attempts by Poles to advocate for their rights were violently quashed through the use of military power, demonstrating that there was no alternative to submission to the imperial hierarchy (Davies, 2005).

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<sup>14</sup>A map of the historical boundaries can be found in the Appendix (Figure A1).

By contrast, the scope of repression, including the use of violence through the state, was relatively limited under Prussian rule (Davies, 2005, 85; Vogler, 2019, 812–813). While the Prussian state denied full self-government to the Poles, it nevertheless provided several meaningful channels of participation, including, as of 1849, the right to limited political representation in a Prussian representative assembly. Moreover, during the period of Imperial Germany (1871–1914), Poles were given full voting rights in federal parliamentary elections and were permitted to establish political parties. Thus, we can most clearly distinguish between the character of foreign rule of Prussia and Russia. Although comparable in duration, Russian rule remained highly repressive throughout the entire period, while Prussia’s state had a *Rechtsstaat* character and permitted meaningful political participation for several decades.<sup>15</sup>

Compared to Prussia and Russia, the character of Austrian rule was uneven. The early years of Austrian occupation featured strict censoring of the Polish press and severe oppression of Polish attempts at self-government, both indicative of encompassing repression. In later years, however (especially after 1867), Poles were given the opportunity to participate in the Austrian bureaucracy. Yet political rights—including voting rights—remained severely restricted until the last few years of foreign rule (Davies, 2005; Vushko, 2015). Most importantly, the first mass elections, which allowed a large share of the population to participate in democratic political processes, only took place in 1907 (Howe, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2022), shortly before the disintegration of the empire and likely unable to change political

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<sup>15</sup>Given the clear distinction between Prussia and Russia specifically, our empirical analysis primarily focuses on this comparison. We include the comparisons with Austria in the Appendix (section A.9), but as elaborated below, this case is ambiguous in light of our framework.

attitudes in a sustainable fashion.

In terms of our theory outlined in [Figure 1](#), the Russian-ruled territory of Poland is located in the lower righthand quadrant, indicating a high potential for a legacy related to pro-authoritarian voting. The area ruled by Prussia is located in the lower lefthand quadrant, indicating a moderate potential for such a legacy. Finally, the location of the Austrian-ruled territory is ambiguous given the shifting character of Austrian rule over time, which makes categorization difficult.

## **Brazil**

In the case of Brazilian military rule (which resulted from a coup d'état by the armed forces in 1964), the local suppression of self-government was much shorter and much less encompassing than in the case of Poland. The entire interlude of military rule lasted only twenty-one years (1964–1985). Moreover, political restrictions, while certainly severe relative to previous periods, nevertheless still allowed for various forms of participation.

Specifically, unlike other military regimes in the region, Brazil's military permitted open competition among (pre-approved) political actors for many offices.<sup>16</sup> It also utilized violent repression sparingly, committing human rights abuses with significantly lower frequency than the regimes ensconced in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay ([Heinz and Frühling, 1999](#)). Although the military was critical of Brazil's democracy, it neither extinguished party politics altogether nor organized society into a single-party state. Rather, in its second institutional act (AI-2) of 1965, it dissolved the existing system, substituting in its place an officially

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<sup>16</sup>On the factors that influence an authoritarian regime's incentive to adopt competitive (multiparty) elections, see [Mitchell \(2023\)](#).

sanctioned two-party system.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to creating the foundations of the new party system, AI-2 created a mechanism for the selection of political officeholders. The president and vice-president were chosen by the Chamber of Deputies and governors by their state legislatures. This ensured that high-level executive officeholders would either be military officers (the president) or their clients (governors). However, state, federal, and municipal legislative offices were contested at regular intervals through popular elections. Thus, while the highest-level executive offices were removed from democratic contention, most formerly elected offices remained subject to a popular vote.<sup>18</sup>

The type of suppression of local self-government that we focus on took place within this larger institutional context. Due to AI-2 and subsequent decrees promulgated by the government, (1) state capitals, (2) municipalities designated as areas of strategic interest, (3) municipalities with hydromineral wealth, and (4) municipalities within federal territories were prohibited from selecting their mayors through elections. Rather, these mayors were appointed by the governor (a military loyalist), in concordance with the state assembly or the President. In total, 180 different municipalities (out of more than 4000) had appointed mayors.

Where it occurred, this was a potentially impactful intervention given the traditional

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<sup>17</sup>The parties in this system were the Brazilian Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). ARENA was the authoritarian government's official support party. The MDB was the officially tolerated opposition party.

<sup>18</sup>However, some politicians—especially those suspected of communist sympathies—were prohibited from running for office (Skidmore, 1988).

importance of Brazilian mayors. During the prior democratic period, mayors and mayoral candidates were key political actors who mobilized voters in elections (Gingerich, 2020) and helped register them to vote (Limongi, Cheibub and Figueiredo, 2019). Thus, by eliminating some mayoral elections, the military government was conceivably refashioning one of the central linkages in the Brazilian electoral process.

Yet the location of the Brazilian case in our framework (Figure 1) is nevertheless clear: it belongs in the upper left-hand quadrant, indicating a minimal potential for a legacy. The suppression of municipal self-government (which in most cases lasted less than twenty years) was too brief to catalyze major shifts in political value systems. Moreover, the continued use of elections for various offices and the rarity of state violence directed at regime critics meant that the skills and values acquired under the prior democratic regime would still basically conform to the realities of life in affected municipalities, providing few incentives for fundamental changes.<sup>19</sup>

## **Measuring Legacies — Leveraging Spatial Variation within the Cases**

In addition to capturing variation in our theory, these cases also facilitate the measurement of our outcome (the presence or absence of a legacy). To properly assess whether or not an episode of suppression has generated a legacy, its within-country dynamics need to have unfolded in such a way as to permit causal inference. Ideally, there would either be some quasi-random element to the spatial distribution of the suppression of self-government or

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<sup>19</sup>We provide an extended discussion of the historical background of both cases in the Appendix.

exact knowledge of the conditions that generated it. The episodes of suppression in both Poland and Brazil share this rare virtue, thereby permitting us to categorize the cases according to the presence or absence of a legacy with a high degree of confidence.

For the case of Poland, multiple studies have confirmed that imperial border placement was quasi-random, with no significant differences in geography or pretreatment characteristics among the localities incorporated into different empires (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015, 56–60; Vogler, 2019). Moreover, historians describe the conditions on the ground as not influencing border placement in any way (Chapman, 2006, 56; Hoensch, 1990, 180; Kuk, 2021, 143-144). Thus, we have a strong claim of quasi-randomness based on a combination of empirical evidence and contextual information.

For the case of Brazil, we have nearly exact knowledge of the conditions that led to the appointment of mayors in some municipalities but not others. Additionally, we can measure these factors directly. This implies that an estimation strategy based on selection-on-observables may closely approximate the true causal impact of intervention.

## **A Lasting Legacy of the Suppression of Self-Government: Evidence from Poland**

For the case of Poland, we examine the electoral success of the party “Law and Justice” (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) in mayoral elections in the 2010s.<sup>20</sup> A populist party with clear illiberal tendencies, the PiS had strong electoral support at all levels of government

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<sup>20</sup>As touched upon previously, from the perspective of our framework, focusing on these elections represents a “hard test” case because they took place roughly one century after the disintegration of the empires that had partitioned Poland.

during the 2000s and 2010s (Charnysh, 2017). The party utilized its power to dismantle Poland’s constitutional system of checks and balances, leading observers to characterize it as a danger to democracy (Markowski, 2019; Sadurski, 2018). Given the PiS’s anti-system orientation, we consider its success as reflecting authoritarianism-compatible values among the electorate.

As previously discussed, we expect that municipalities in the formerly Russian territory will be more likely to have mayors that are affiliated with this party than municipalities in the Prussian territory. Due to the more ambiguous character of Austrian rule, we abstain from making strong predictions about this case and relegate the relevant results to the Appendix (section A.9). In order to conduct our analysis, we primarily use data by Charasz and Vogler (2021), which is mainly based on data by Statistics Poland (2021).

## Dependent Variables

We employ two measures of the PiS’s electoral success:

1. **Mayor PiS:** This variable is equal to 1 if the mayor elected in a municipality belonged to the party Law and Justice (PiS) for the time period indicated (2010–2014, 2014–2018); 0 otherwise.
2. **Mayor PiS (Broad Definition):** This variable is equal to 1 if the mayor elected in a municipality belonged to the PiS or was supported by its electoral committee in 2014–2018; 0 otherwise.

## Treatment Variable

We concentrate on the distinction between Russian and Prussian rule, utilizing a treatment variable equal to 1 if a municipality historically belonged to the Russian partition (1815–1914) and 0 if it belonged to the Prussian partition (1815–1918). Due to extensive population



resettlement, we exclude municipalities that belonged to interwar Germany from the analyses (e.g., Charnysh and Peisakhin, 2022).<sup>21</sup> Although both partitions were equally lengthy, Russian rule was highly repressive in comparison with Prussian rule. Thus, according to our theory, the Russian-Prussian comparison has a high potential to reveal a legacy of stronger pro-authoritarian voting tendencies in the former relative to the latter.

## Covariates

To account for the possibility that our results merely reflect cross-regional socioeconomic differences, we also present models with municipal-level control variables. These include the level of elevation, population density, the share of the population that lives in urban areas, the unemployment rate, the average monthly salary of the county’s inhabitants (as a percentage of the national average), the share of the “working age” population (ages 18–64 for men, 18–59 for women), the share of the “elderly” population (ages 65+ for men, 60+ for women), and the logarithm of population size.<sup>22</sup>

## Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design

We estimate the effect of imperial partitions by utilizing a geographic regression discontinuity design (GRDD). Specifically, we treat the imperial borders as quasi-random cutoffs and use the distance to the border (in km) as the forcing variable. The regressions have the following format:

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<sup>21</sup>See Appendix section A.5 for additional discussion on this point.

<sup>22</sup>Descriptive statistics for our Polish data are presented in the Appendix (Table A1).

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Russia} + \beta_2 \textit{ELV}_i + \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\beta} + f(\textit{geographic location}) + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where  $y_i$  is the dependent variable for municipality  $i$ .  $\beta_1$  represents the difference in the value of the dependent variable between municipalities that belonged to the Russian Empire and those that belonged to Prussia.  $\beta_2$  is the coefficient for elevation (ELV). Control variables are contained in vector  $\mathbf{x}$ . In addition, all regressions include a location function:  $f(\textit{geographic location})$ . We employ three variants of this function. The first expresses geographical location as a linear function of distance to the border and the interaction of distance with the relevant empire dummy. The second does the same but uses a second-order polynomial for distance. The third expresses location as a linear function of distance, but also includes latitude and longitude.<sup>23</sup>


## Results

We find consistent evidence that the contrast between more limited repression (Prussian partition) and more encompassing repression (Russian partition) produces long-term political differences in the electoral success the populist-authoritarian PiS. [Figure 2](#) illustrates our GRDD approach. It depicts the discrete increase in the proportion of mayors belonging to the PiS in the 2014 elections as one crosses the geographic boundary between the Prussian and Russian partitions (at  $x = 0$ ). [Figure 3](#) provides an alternative visualization of the discontinuity. It shows that the distribution of mayors belonging to the PiS in the 2014 elections is concentrated in the partition previously controlled by Russia.

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
<sup>23</sup>Details are presented in the Appendix (section A.6).

Figure 2: Impact of Prussia vs. Russia Partition on Having a PiS Mayor



Note: This figure represents a comparison of the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2014 elections) between former Prussian and Russian municipalities in Poland. Municipalities in the former Prussian partition are on the left; municipalities in the former Russian partition are on the right. The line at zero represents the historical border. The x-axis represents municipalities' distance to the historical border. The corresponding regression is model 1 in [Table 1](#).

Figure 3: Map of PIS-affiliated Mayors in the 2014 Elections



Note: This map shows the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2014 elections) across all three partitions of Poland. The Prussian partition is the western one; the Russian partition is the eastern one; the Austrian partition is the southern one.

Table 1 presents the GRDD results for the Prussia/Russia comparison without control variables. The table indicates that municipalities in the formerly Russian partition are significantly more likely to have a PiS-affiliated mayor. Indeed, being located within the former Russian partition leads to a roughly 0.08 increase in the probability that a municipality will elect a PiS mayor. These findings are robust to the adoption of the latitude/longitude specification and the inclusion of controls (as shown in Appendix section A.7).

Table 1: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Prussia/Russia Comparison)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Br.) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor PIS (4)	Mayor PIS (Br.) (5)	Mayor PIS (2010) (6)
Russia	0.075*** (0.026)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.056** (0.023)	0.066* (0.035)	0.075** (0.036)	0.029 (0.031)
Elevation	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.00005 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Dist. PR-RU	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.00001 (0.001)
Dist. PR-RU Sq.				0.00000 (0.00001)	0.00000 (0.00001)	0.00000 (0.00001)
Russia*Dist.	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Russia*Dist. Sq.				-0.00000 (0.00001)	-0.00000 (0.00001)	-0.00000 (0.00001)
Constant	0.010 (0.028)	0.007 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.0001 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.037)	-0.013 (0.031)
Observations	1,435	1,435	1,437	1,435	1,435	1,437
R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.021	0.018	0.020	0.021	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.018	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.018

Note: OLS

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Evidence for the Underlying Mechanisms

Existing scholarship on Poland offers multiple pieces of evidence in line with our claim that the intervention executed by Prussia led to a shift in cultural values that was distinct from the one produced by the intervention executed by Russia. Hryniewicz (1996) demonstrates that citizens in the formerly Prussian parts of Poland prioritize self-fulfillment over financial security as a key goal of their work lives. This is in line with the notion that values related

to self-efficacy are more prevalent there. Similarly, [Vogler \(2019\)](#) provides evidence that local administrations in the formerly Russian partition have lower levels of transparency and professionalism. Finally, building on the literature that connects self-efficacy and educational attainment in society (e.g., [Ayllón, Alsina and Colomer, 2019](#); [Grabowski, Call and Mortimer, 2001](#); [Schunk, 1989](#)) as well as the literature that connects populism to distrust in higher education and experts (e.g., [Merkley, 2020](#); [Read, 2018](#)), we show in the Appendix (section A.10) that there are significantly fewer mayors with higher education in the formerly Russian partition when compared to the Prussian partition. Taken together, these pieces of evidence indicate that there are important differences in cultural values related to self-efficacy, egalitarianism, and transparency in line with our theoretical predictions.

## **Suppression of Self-Government *without* a Legacy: Evidence from Brazil**

For the case of Brazil, we examine the success of the country's two authoritarian successor parties during the 1988 and 1992 mayoral elections. These two parties were the Social Democratic Party (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, PDS) and the Liberal Front (*Partido da Frente Liberal*, PFL). The PDS was the direct descendent of the official authoritarian (regime-supporting) party, ARENA (which was simply renamed as the PDS in 1980). The PFL was composed of leading figures from the PDS who split with the party over its presidential nominee in 1985 ([Power, 2018](#)). Given previous findings about the legacies of dictatorship-era mayors in the region ([González, Muñoz and Prem, 2021](#)), it is plausible that the PDS and PFL might have had a higher chance of winning mayoral elections as a

consequence of the appointment of mayors during the authoritarian period. Nevertheless, our framework classifies this intervention as both transient and limited in repressive scope. Thus, based on our theory, we deem the likelihood of a legacy as being low. To assess if a legacy existed, municipal-level electoral data on mayoral elections held by each of Brazil's twenty six state-level electoral tribunals were collected and coded specifically for this study (excluding the federal district).<sup>24</sup>

## Dependent Variables

We examine two dependent variables in our analysis:

1. ***PDS Mayor***: This variable is equal to 1 if the mayor elected in a given municipality belonged to the PDS or was elected by a coalition of parties that included the PDS; 0 otherwise.
2. ***PFL Mayor***: This variable is equal to 1 if the mayor elected in a given municipality belonged to the PFL or was elected by a coalition of parties that included the PFL; 0 otherwise.

## Treatment Variable

Our treatment variable is ***Intervened***, equal to 1 for municipalities that had an appointed mayor during military rule; 0 otherwise. This variable is coded from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's compilation of electoral statistics for the 1972 elections, which includes a list of all municipalities that had appointed mayors ([Tribunal Superior Eleitoral \(TSE\), 1988](#)). That list was then supplemented using the information contained in decree laws dealing with national security areas promulgated after the election (1973–1981), which listed additional

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<sup>24</sup>In the majority of cases where the data were not in electronic format, this entailed coding the data from PDFs of the original electoral acts.

municipalities with appointed mayors.<sup>25</sup> Municipalities that were newly created in the post-authoritarian period and located within the previous boundaries of a municipality with an appointed mayor were also coded as having been intervened.<sup>26</sup>

## Covariates

In selecting the covariates, we exploit knowledge about the factors considered by the military government in deciding which municipalities to prohibit from having elections. We make use of the fact that the features that made municipalities of national security interest were clearly defined, as were the characteristics that made them sites of hydromineral wealth. We also exploit knowledge about the dimensions upon which state capitals differ from other municipalities.

When using the language of national security in reference to municipalities, the military government was typically referring to concerns about controlling its interior border zones. These concerns were manifested in efforts like the National Integration Scheme in 1970, which brought colonists from more populated areas of Brazil to settle in the Amazon (Flynn, 1978, 452), and the promulgation of Law N<sup>o</sup>. 6.634 (May 2, 1979), which prevented foreigners from acquiring land in border areas. Thus, a municipality's degree of national security concern

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<sup>25</sup>The aforementioned laws were Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.272 (May 29, 1973), Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.273 (May 29, 1973), Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.284 (August 28, 1973), Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.316 (March 12, 1974), Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.480 (September 9, 1976), Decree Law N<sup>o</sup> 1.481 (September 9, 1976), and Complementary Law N<sup>o</sup> 41 (December 22, 1981).

<sup>26</sup>The coding for these cases is based on the municipal administrative histories provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in its *Cidades* website ([cidades.ibge.gov.br](http://cidades.ibge.gov.br)).



was a function of its distance to the border.

In targeting sites of hydromineral wealth for intervention, the actions of the military government reflected a long-term preoccupation in Brazil with the therapeutic and medicinal value of mineral water, one dating back to the early/mid-nineteenth century (Marrichi, 2017). Such sites also played an important role in the growth of the hotel and tourism industries (Franco, 2017). Thus, the decision of the military government to prohibit elections in locations with hydromineral wealth can be interpreted as an attempt to shield these valued resources from the perceived risks of political mismanagement.

As stated earlier, a third major rationale for intervention was that a municipality was a state capital. Of course, Brazilian state capitals are *sui generis*, so structuring relatively pure as-if-random comparisons based on these units is infeasible. However, we do have information on some of the major ways they differ from other municipalities. Besides the fact that they are the seats of government, state capitals tend to be more populous than most other municipalities and have higher levels of human development.

Given these considerations, we employ a select set of covariates in order to maximize the credibility of our causal inferences based on (conditional) differences between municipalities that experienced an intervention and those that did not. Our covariate set is as follows:

1. ***Distance to Border (Log.)***: This is the logarithm of the distance (in kilometers) from the center of a municipality to the nearest land border.<sup>27</sup>
2. ***Mineral Water***: This variable is equal to 1 if a municipality was listed as having a

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<sup>27</sup>Distances were constructed using shape files for Brazilian municipalities (for the year 1991) compiled by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) (IBGE, 2011), as well as data on latitude and longitude compiled from the IBGE by Kelvin S. do Prado (<http://github.com/kelvins/Municipios-Brasileiros>).

concession to extract mineral water according to a study commissioned by the Ministry of Mines and Energy on the distribution of mineral water (Queiroz, 2004); 0 otherwise.

3. **Population (Log.):** This variable is equal to the logarithm of the population size of the municipality (measured in 1996). Data come from the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA; [www.ipeadata.gov.br](http://www.ipeadata.gov.br)).
4. **Human Development:** This variable is the municipal human development index (measured in 1991). It is a composite indicator of well-being based on municipal-level outcomes in the dimensions of health, education, and economic prosperity. Data come from the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA; [www.ipeadata.gov.br](http://www.ipeadata.gov.br)).

Descriptive statistics for our Brazilian data are presented in the Appendix (Table A10 in section A.13). These are complemented by an analysis of the impact of the aforementioned covariates on the likelihood that a municipality would experience an intervention (Figure A10 in section A.14). Consistent with the above discussion about the factors that drove the military’s decision to intervene locally, we show that intervention was strongly and negatively related to a municipality’s distance from the nearest land border and positively related to the presence of mineral water and population size. The relationship to human development was negative, albeit small in magnitude.

## Design

We adopt a research design that maximizes comparisons across municipalities with similar characteristics. In particular, we focus on within-state variation between municipalities that experienced interventions and those that did not, holding constant the covariates described above. In this regard, we employ two functionally similar estimation strategies. First, we estimate the impact of intervention by utilizing a linear probability regression model with fixed effects by state. Second, we estimate the impact of intervention by utilizing exact matching on state and the presence of mineral water in conjunction with coarsened exact

matching on distance to the nearest land border, population, and human development.<sup>28</sup> Since we recognize that state capitals may differ from non-state capitals along many dimensions beyond population size and human development, we present all our results both with state capitals included as well as excluded.

## Ruling Out Ideological Selection

One potential source of concern about the empirical strategy described above is ideological selection. It is possible that the military government was more likely to impose appointed mayors in municipalities that exhibited support for leftist candidates in the years leading up to the intervention in 1964. If this was the case, then our estimates of the effect of the suppression of local self-rule could suffer from omitted variable bias, since the ideological leanings of municipalities before military rule are likely correlated with support for the two authoritarian successor parties.

To address this possibility, we examine support for Brazil's most prominent left-wing politician of the era: João Goulart. Goulart was the sitting president deposed by the military. His support for broad social reforms and his perceived sympathy with communist regimes was used by military and civilian actors to justify the coup. Goulart came to the presidency by way of the vice-presidency, an office to which he was independently elected in 1960. Thus, if the Brazilian military was engaged in ideological selection when choosing where to impose

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<sup>28</sup>To implement coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012), we discretized the distance to the nearest land border into the following categories:  $\leq 250\text{km}$ ,  $[250\text{km}, 500\text{km})$ ,  $[500\text{km}, 1000\text{km})$ ,  $\geq 1000\text{km}$ . Population size was discretized into categories defined by the quartiles of that variable. Human development was discretized into categories defined its terciles. The R package **cem** was utilized to conduct the analysis.

appointed mayors, one would expect that this would be evident in vote patterns for Goulart in the 1960 vice-presidential election. Figure A9 in the Appendix presents the data using box-and-whisker plots. As shown therein, there is no evidence for ideological selection: The distribution of vote shares for Goulart in municipalities that were assigned appointed mayors was nearly identical to that encountered municipalities that were allowed to continue electing their mayors. This is true examining the full sample, including state capitals, as well as in a restricted sample with state capitals excluded.<sup>29</sup>

## Results

Before turning to the findings, it is important to clarify that key aspects of our evaluation of the Brazilian case create, if anything, a bias *in favor* of encountering a legacy of pro-authoritarian voting. The 1988 and 1992 elections were the first nationally held municipal elections after the end of military rule, meaning that the lived experiences of intervention were still fresh. Moreover, the two parties whose electoral success we consider were strongly linked in the public mind with authoritarian rule.<sup>30</sup> If any legacy of intervention for pro-authoritarian voting had been created, one would expect it to be discernible in these elections.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirmed the similarity of the distributions. P-values for said tests were equal to 0.125 and 0.220 in the full and restricted samples, respectively.

<sup>30</sup>In the 48th Congress (1987–1991), nearly 90% of the PDS’s congressional delegation was made up of former ARENA politicians and officials; for the PFL, the figure was nearly 80% (Power, 2000, 75).

<sup>31</sup>As mentioned earlier, from the perspective of our framework, focusing on these elections therefore represents a “hard test” case.

Our findings are presented in [Figure 4](#) (based on a linear probability model, LPM) and [Figure 5](#) (based on coarsened exact matching, CEM). The underlying conclusions from both sets of estimations are very similar: We detect no appreciable effect of a legacy of intervention on electoral support for ASPs in Brazil. [Figure 4](#) presents the point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals of the impact of having had an appointed mayor for sixteen different specifications of the LPM.


Estimates are presented separately by outcome (PDS victory, PFL victory), electoral cycle (1988, 1992), inclusion of state capitals in the sample (included, excluded), and inclusion of control variables (included, excluded). Given the historical variation in voting behavior across Brazilian regions, state fixed effects were included in all analyses. As is evident in [Figure 4](#), in none of the various specifications did the coefficient on *Intervened* reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Moreover, the effects were consistently close to zero in magnitude (ranging from a reduction of three percentage points to a similar increase).

Focusing on the CEM results, [Figure 5](#) presents the point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals depicting the average treatment for the treated (ATT) due to having had an appointed mayor. Estimates are broken down by outcome, electoral cycle, and inclusion of state capitals. Here again we find that estimates of the effect of *Intervened* were statistically indistinguishable from zero and had small magnitudes.

## **Evidence for the Underlying Mechanisms**

Extant scholarship provides evidence that is consistent with our arguments about why a legacy of intervention was unlikely to emerge in Brazil. In addition to the fact that the episodes of suppression were too short to affect intergenerational values transmission, there

Figure 4: Linear Probability Model of Impact of Intervention on Support for Authoritarian Successor Parties in Brazil



**Legend:**

- Full Sample (w/ capitals)
- no controls, fixed effects (state)
- Restricted Sample (w/o capitals)
- controls, fixed effects (state)

Note: Fixed effects for state included in all regressions. Detailed results for all underlying regressions can be found in Table A12 and Table A13 in the Appendix.


was little impetus for citizens to fundamentally change their political skills. As shown by studies examining political career trajectories in the states of Minas Gerais (Hagopian, 1996) and Rio Grande do Sul (Gerardi, 2015), there was considerable congruence between state

and local-level political elites before and after the onset of military government. This lack of elite turnover, taken in conjunction with the fact that so many political offices could still be contested electorally, made it feasible for political actors to continue using existing strategies of political networking and mobilization in spite of military rule and local intervention.<sup>32</sup> Consistent with this point, recent research on Minas Gerais demonstrates continuity in the use of local elites as vote brokers before and after the period of military rule (Gingerich, 2014; Gingerich, 2020).

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<sup>32</sup>For the case of Rio Grande do Sul, Gerardi (2015) notes that “the fact of someone being chosen to occupy the post of mayor via the closed recruitment system did not isolate these individuals from the electoral market...nominated mayors supported councilmen, deputies (state, federal), politicians regularly facing elections” (158, author’s translation).

Figure 5: Coarsened Exact Matching Estimates of Impact of Intervention on Support for Authoritarian Successor Parties in Brazil



Note: Detailed results for all underlying regressions can be found in Table A14 in the Appendix.

## Conclusion

Historically, the suppression of local self-government by empires or centralized authoritarian regimes was common around the world (Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg, 2018). When can



we expect such denials of local political autonomy to result in sustained legacies manifest in voting behavior? We argue that *enduring* interventions associated with *encompassing* repression have the highest potential to sustainably change political attitudes and behavior. In contrast, interventions that are *limited* in both duration and repression are the least likely to produce a legacy.

To illustrate the broad applicability of our argument, we examine the distinctive episodes of suppression that occurred in Brazil during the military regime and in Poland during its imperial partition. In Poland, there were crucial differences between the imperial powers that occupied it for more than a century: Prussia allowed for relatively broad political participation by the Poles and its rule was comparatively constrained, with a limited use of violence against the population. By contrast, Russia's rule remained highly repressive in both dimensions throughout. Moreover, in Brazil, the authoritarian regime installed its political allies as mayors of certain cities, but did so in a manner that was limited in both duration and repressiveness.

The study's results highlight that episodes of suppression have *vastly* different potentials to create legacies depending on their characteristics. In Poland, citizens in the areas that were subject to more than a century of repressive and militarized foreign rule (through Russia) show a clear tendency to elect mayors that belong to the populist and antidemocratic right-wing party Law and Justice. In Brazil, on the other hand, the experience of externally appointed mayors imposed during the military regime did not appear to leave a legacy in terms of support for authoritarian successor parties. The shorter duration of the intervention and its relatively limited repressive scope help explain this outcome.

Beyond the specific contribution to understanding the consequences of suppression of

self-government, this paper offers a template for future comparative research on the instantiation of legacies. As we see it, there are five critical steps in such endeavors. First, one selects a class of potentially-legacy inducing events (e.g., demographic shocks, labor coercion, suppression of self-government). Second, one chooses the outcome(s) for which legacies of events in the chosen class will be assessed (e.g., voting behavior, economic development, political violence). Third, given the choice of event class and outcome(s), one develops a theory relating variation in the characteristics of events within the class (e.g., size of the demographic shock, length of suppression, severity of coercion) to variation in the likelihood that a legacy is instantiated.<sup>33</sup> Fourth, one selects cases that permit the theory to be tested. Said cases must ideally exhibit appropriate cross-case and within-case variation to allow for rigorous causal inference.<sup>34</sup> Finally, one empirically assesses the existence of a legacy in the cases and situates the findings relative to the expectations generated by the theory.

The virtue of such an approach is that it can simultaneously respect existing evidentiary standards for establishing the existence or non-existence of a legacy in any given case, while leveraging the comparative method to improve understanding about the aspects of certain types of events that make them more or less likely to produce lasting change. Naturally, adding a cross-national dimension to legacy studies may present certain challenges. We

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<sup>33</sup>Importantly, theories of this type are *limited* in that they link a *specific class of events* to legacies defined on a *specific outcome or set of outcomes*. They do not consist of generic statements about how *any* class of event might lead to a legacy for *any* type of outcome.

<sup>34</sup>With respect to the former, there must be variation across the cases in the event characteristics specified by the theory as driving the likelihood of a legacy. With respect to the latter, there must be internal spatial variation in the presence of the potentially legacy-inducing event, as such variation is necessary to establish the existence or non-existence of a legacy in each (aggregate) case.

harbor no illusions that finding cases with precisely the right types of cross-case and within-case variation will be an easy task.

Moreover, our template requires that potential legacy-inducing events be defined broadly enough to make a comparative approach possible. This may lead to seemingly unconventional comparisons, with cases potentially differing in contextual details or historical setting. While cognizant of the risks of conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970), we believe that movement in this direction is salutary for the literature on legacies. First, this is because we believe that the question of why legacies do or do not form—a puzzle that *necessitates* a comparative lens—is a problem of first order importance. Second, situating key aspects of national experiences into *classes* of legacy-inducing events contributes to knowledge accumulation, since doing so clarifies the theoretical payoff of the results from country case studies. Third, findings from studies based on multiple (partly divergent) cases also allow for critical reflection of variation in historical circumstances, including contextual commonalities and differences between the cases that may affect the generalizability of empirical findings. In sum, there is a great deal to be gained from a comparative approach to the study of historical legacies.

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When are Junctures Critical?  
The Legacies and Non-Legacies of the  
Suppression of Local Self-Government

Online Appendix

January 14, 2025

# A Appendix

## A.1 Theory Supplement: Extended Discussion of the Mechanisms

In the main body of our study, we elaborate on the conditions under which the suppression of self-government can be expected to result in long-term legacies. Therein, we also distinguish between the extent of repression and the duration of intervention as key factors that determine whether or not a political legacy will materialize. In this supplementary section, we provide additional detail on the specific mechanisms that we expect to lead to changes in political behavior as a consequence of the removal of local self-government. Importantly, as we describe below and in line with our main theory, all these mechanisms are most likely to apply to a case of *enduring* interventions with *encompassing repression* and least likely to apply in the case of *transient* interventions with *limited repression*.

In general, we consider two main types of external interventions as suppression of local self-government: imperial conquest and rule (both of a direct and indirect character) and local political control through a centralized authoritarian state. The commonality between these two kinds of interventions is the denial of full local political autonomy by a non-local actor. When political autonomy is denied, the negative effects on affected communities are multifaceted.

### A.1.1 An Overview of Relevant Mechanisms

What are the consequences of the suppression of local self-government? Especially if sustained over time, the inability of individuals to participate in and take responsibility for political leadership in their community may shape the manner in which they view their fellow citizens and even come to view themselves. The classic treatise by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) was among the earliest and most influential works to make this point, tying regional variation in civic community in the present day to historical experiences of political autonomy or subjugation. An implication of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti’s argument is that in the long run self-government breeds interpersonal trust, which facilitates citizens’ capacity to coordinate their electoral support around political leaders who provide better public goods and services. Sustained suppression of self-government, by the same token, may undermine interpersonal trust and weaken electoral accountability.

Extant evidence from laboratory settings is consistent with the postulated link between experience with self-government and a cooperative disposition among citizens. Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) show that individuals are significantly more likely to engage in cooperative behavior if they are able to choose policies themselves (through voting) than if policies are imposed upon them. Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) demonstrate that cooperation depends on how leaders are chosen: Individuals able to choose their leaders themselves contribute more to public goods than individuals whose leaders are chosen by lottery. Similarly, Markussen, Putterman and Tyran (2014) report that formal and informal mechanisms of curbing free-riding are more effective when they have been democratically selected by subjects. Furthermore, Kamei (2016) finds evidence of legacy effects: Individuals who participate in a democratic policymaking process continue to exhibit high levels of cooperative behavior even when subsequently placed in undemocratic contexts. Sausgruber, Sonntag and Tyran (2021) show that individuals react more pro-socially to policies that are selected democratically than to those for which they have no input. Most recently, Haas, Hassan and Morton (2020) provide evidence that interpersonal trust among subjects from established democracies is more resilient to negative shocks than is the case for subjects from new democracies. As indicated in our main theory section, if these effects can persist over long time periods, they are most likely to lead to sustained changes in political behavior—even after an external intervention has come to an end. Similarly, the many different highlighted pathways through which removal of local autonomy negatively affects political behavior indicate that forms of intervention that affect more dimensions (i.e., that are more extensive in their repressiveness) will have the most comprehensive consequences.

Moreover, all of these findings imply that interpersonal trust and cooperative attitudes spring from sustained experiences with self-government, and that they are likely to wither as a consequence of the suppression of self-government, especially if such suppression is sustained over long periods of time. Yet a disposition towards cooperation is not the only aspect of citizens’ worldviews that may be affected by the suppression of self-government. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2016) suggest an additional channel of influence: individuals’ beliefs about self-efficacy. Revisiting Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti’s arguments about the legacies of communal government in Italy, the aforementioned study demonstrates that schoolchildren from the former communal republics in the North hold fundamentally different beliefs about the role of effort versus luck in shaping life outcomes than do schoolchildren in other areas. For the first group of children, effort trumps luck, whereas the opposite is the case for the second group. Thus, the suppression of self-government—by weakening a community’s opportunity to fully develop a sense of self-efficacy and responsibility for governance—may mitigate the intergenerational transmission of the belief that one’s actions can meaningfully shape life prospects. A key insight from these findings about potential long-term changes to culture and the intergenerational transmission of values is that the norms undergirding citizen participation and democratic governance can be influenced in ways such that the effects are visible long after self-government has resumed.

The implications of a sustained and repressive suppression of self-government for downstream political behavior follow largely from the norms and belief systems outlined above. We postulate that, depending on context, episodes of the suppression of self-government contribute to: (1) support for populist or anti-system politicians and parties; or (2) support for authoritarian successor parties (ASPs).

### A.1.2 Specific Mechanisms Regarding Populist (Anti-System) Parties

Consider first support for populist or anti-system politicians and parties. A growing body of evidence links the electoral prospects of anti-system actors to low levels of social capital and trust. This is particularly well documented for European party



systems, with the extant studies on Latin America similarly indicating the existence of such a relationship.<sup>1</sup>

Keefer, Scartascini and Vlaicu (2019) provide a theoretical framework that explains why this should be so. In polities characterized by low levels of interpersonal trust, voters cannot count on one another to coordinate around responsible candidates with the skill and willpower to provide high-quality public goods and services. Rather, in the spirit of “each voter for themselves,” a pattern of electoral free riding emerges where voters gravitate towards politicians offering immediate, simple, and often personalized solutions to complex policy problems (the hallmark of populist parties).

In such a context, political platforms that promise to dispossess (so-called) elites, that scapegoat immigrants or other out-groups, and/or that advocate the transfer of resources to “virtuous” members of the polity are likely to draw in large segments of the electorate. Of course, such appeals are the “bread and butter” of populist, anti-system politicians. Thus, by undermining interpersonal trust, the suppression of self-government may in the long-run prime the electorate in favor of anti-system actors.

Long-run changes in self-efficacy beliefs may likewise play a role in generating support for anti-system actors. Social psychological research has shown that reducing subjects’ personal control in an experimental setting strengthens beliefs about the existence of powerful political and personal enemies (Sullivan, Landau and Rothschild, 2010) and leads to the perception of conspiracies (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008).<sup>2</sup> Anti-system politicians are in this way inherently advantaged by a polity characterized by a low sense of self-efficacy, since the use of conspiratorial language about elites operating as “enemies of the people” (to borrow a phrase frequently used by Joseph Stalin, and more recently by Donald Trump) is a nearly universal feature of their political rhetoric (cf. Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2007; Myers and Hawkins, 2011). Accordingly, the fact that the suppression of self-government may undermine collectively held beliefs about self-efficacy provides another reason to expect that they will favor anti-system political actors. As with the previous mechanism, this mechanism is more likely to apply when instances of the suppression of self-government are sustained and associated with encompassing repression.

### A.1.3 Specific Mechanisms Regarding Authoritarian Successor Parties

Now consider support for ASPs. Scholarship points to two factors that may play a role in shaping the relationship between a sustained episode of suppression of self-government and support for these organizations: (1) ideology and (2) political organization. ASPs will be most successful when citizens internalize rather than reject the regime ideology (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017). Internalization clearly occurs in certain contexts, especially in societies where the authoritarian regime is able to heavily invest in indoctrination efforts over a long time period (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Cantoni, Chen, Yang, Yuchtman and Zhang, 2017; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2020). Where episodes of suppression are most prolonged and/or comprehensive, the internalization of regime ideology will likely be greatest. Because a sustained absence of self-government undermines communal cohesiveness as well as citizens’ collective sense of self-efficacy, authoritarian subjects in such contexts may not have the independence of mind nor social support necessary to resist the regime’s indoctrination efforts. Consequently, if sustained for an extensive period, indoctrination takes root, creating an ideological bias in favor of authoritarian successor parties after self-government has resumed.

Support for authoritarian successor parties also rests on organizational factors (Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Loxton, 2018; Miller, 2021; Serra, 2013). Possibly one of the most important among these is the capacity to mobilize voters. Generally speaking, authoritarian successor parties that have extensive clientelist networks and enjoy privileged access to state resources will be most successful on election day. Where self-government is suppressed over long periods of time, one would expect authoritarian successor parties to have these attributes. Indeed, examining a sample of political parties around the world, Kitschelt and Singer (2018) find evidence for precisely this link: Authoritarian successor parties emergent from episodes of the suppression of self-government lasting ten years or more have more extensive clientelist networks and expend more effort on clientelism than other parties. This is compatible with our expectations: Sustained and comprehensive episodes of the suppression of self-government may permit authoritarian elites to co-opt and/or subsume local notables and family dynasties within the official party, thereby giving the authoritarian successor party a significant advantage in its capacity to exploit practices such as vote brokerage for electoral gain.

### A.1.4 Summary

In short, in this section we have proposed a variety of mechanisms that connect sustained and repressive episodes of the suppression of self-government to long-term changes in political behavior. For this reason, the applicability of each of these mechanisms is clearly moderated by the two factors discussed in our main framework. In general, there is ample evidence from a broad range of studies that any sustained denial of local political autonomy has the potential to negatively affect participatory behavior and bolster the efforts of parties that are explicitly anti-system (such as many populist parties and authoritarian successor parties).

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<sup>1</sup>For analyses tying low social capital and trust to support for anti-system parties in Europe, see Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir (2007), Hooghe, Marien and Pauwels (2011), Berning and Ziller (2017), and Hooghe and Dassonneville (2018). For studies on Latin America tying low trust to voting for anti-system candidates and support for the policies advocated by such candidates, see Doyle (2011) and Keefer, Scartascini and Vlaicu (2019).


<sup>2</sup>Conspiracy beliefs, in turn, have been empirically linked with populist attitudes that drive support for anti-system politicians (Castanho Silva, Vegetti and Littvay, 2017).

## A.2 First Case Supplement: Extended Discussion of the Historical Background

### A.2.1 The Historical Borders

Figure A1 shows both the historical borders of the imperial partitions of Poland in combination with the administrative boundaries of contemporary municipalities.

Figure A1: Map of the Historical Boundaries



Note: This map shows the borders of contemporary municipalities in Poland as well as the borders between the three major empires that historically ruled Poland (1815–1914). Prussia was a part of the German Empire as of 1871, which is why this part is labeled “Germany” here.

### A.2.2 The Suppression of Self-Government by Prussia

The first one among the imperial powers that ruled parts of the Polish lands was Prussia. Prussia began introducing its own legal-administrative system in the occupied Polish territories in the late eighteenth century (Hoensch, 1990, 181; Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006, 137; Prazmowska, 2011, 131; Wandycz, 1975, 14–15; Vogler, 2019, 812–813).

After 1815, Prussia controlled large parts of Western Poland, including many territories with significant Polish population majorities. Even in those territories, the Polish people had to follow Prussian laws and accept the Prussian system of government. Accordingly, they were denied the right to fully self-govern.

While the Prussian state denied full self-government to the Poles, its institutions were highly reliable and effective, especially when compared to Russian rule in the eastern parts of Poland. Prussian state representatives were also subject to an advanced legal system that punished corruption and unjustified violent behavior, implying a low level of state-directed violence against the population. Additionally, as of 1849, the Polish minority enjoyed limited political representation in the Prussian *Landtag* (an important representative assembly of the Prussian state), which provided some initial avenues for political participation. Particularly in comparison with early Austrian rule and the extremely coercive and militarized Russian rule throughout the entire period 1815–1914, Prussia’s system was seen as relatively benign (Davies, 2005, 85; Vogler, 2019, 812–813).

Most importantly, in the period of Imperial Germany (1871–1914), the Poles were given full voting rights in federal parliamentary elections and were permitted to establish political parties that represented their minority interests. While self-government was inhibited when it came to the design of administrative and legal institutions, the fact that the Polish minority had the right to organize politically over several decades gave the Poles important and sustained experience with democratic processes and political participation.

### A.2.3 The Suppression of Self-Government by Russia

The second imperial power that ruled large parts of the Polish lands throughout the nineteenth century was Russia. Compared to Prussia, Russia’s foreign rule was significantly more repressive, antagonistic, and militarized.

The Russian state was primarily seen as an oppressive force against the Polish people that used coercion and military force to maintain its rule. It governed the Polish territories with a high level of coercion and arbitrariness (Davies, 2005, ch. 2; Raphael, 2000, 67–71, 74–75; Vogler, 2019, 814–815). This state of affairs, taken in conjunction with the absence of any democratic forms of self-government and poor living standards, provoked several armed uprisings against the Russian state and military throughout the nineteenth century. Unsurprisingly, these uprisings were smashed by Russia through the relentless use of military power (Davies, 2005; Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006; Prazmowska, 2011; Wandycz, 1975).

Accordingly, while the Poles in the western territories were forced to accept Prussian institutions but had the right to have their own political parties in the German parliament, in the east they were not only completely denied the right to self-govern, but also experienced a militarized suppression that lasted for decades. Any attempts at collective action against the

repressive Russian state were brutally put down and squashed hopes for an independent state with forms of democratic/inclusive self-government.

#### A.2.4 The Suppression of Self-Government by Austria

The third imperial power that ruled some of the Polish territories was Austria. The lands of the Austrian partition are historically known as Galicia. With respect to Polish self-government, Austria had a more mixed history than Prussia and Russia. Even though it also acted as a highly oppressive state from 1815 to 1867, after 1867 it gradually began to give more rights to the Poles, including the hiring of Polish personnel in the regional/local bureaucracy and the use of the Polish language in administrative affairs (Davies, 2005; Lukowski and Zawadzki, 2006; Prazmowska, 2011; Vogler, 2019; Vushko, 2015).

Austrian rule also began with a very strict censoring of the Polish press and the oppression of all Polish attempts at self-government. Especially in the period 1849–1859, the so-called period of *neoabsolutism*—as a response to the failed 1848 revolution—the Austrian state intensified its attempts to control its entire territory, including through political repression in Galicia (Deak, 2015; Judson, 2016). Yet, after 1867, the Austrian state began to change its strategy of rule. Beginning in this year, Austria granted greater levels of administrative participation to the Poles. More Polish personnel were hired to work in the public administration and Poles were permitted to send representatives to Vienna.

At the same time, several social and political hierarchies persisted. First and most importantly, while administrative autonomy had been given to the province of Galicia, it was still subject to the general laws of the Austrian state, meaning that foreign rule persisted (albeit in less severe form). Moreover, unlike the German Empire in 1871, the Austrian state did not introduce full and equal voting rights to the Poles of Galicia. Instead, there was a class-based voting system that prevented many people from having any influence on political processes. Only for two elections (in 1907 and 1911) were full voting rights given to the Poles (see also Howe, Szöcsik and Zuber, 2022), meaning that the majority of inhabitants of the Austrian partition (like their counterparts in the Russian partition) gained little experience with democratic processes. Accordingly, the greater level of Polish participation in the bureaucracy of Galicia did not change the fact that the Austrian state did not allow for full democratic participation until 1907, a few years before the end of Austrian rule in the territory.

In short, when it comes to the suppression of self-government, the Austrian case is more ambiguous than the other two. At first, the Austrian state’s rule in Poland was highly repressive. While it allowed for administrative decentralization after 1867, the introduction of fully democratic institutions happened so late in the Austrian Empire (1907) that it might not have had a sufficiently profound impact to shape long-term prospects for effective and sustained experience with self-government.

### A.3 First Case Supplement: Extended Discussion of the Chosen Time Period and Outcome Measure in the Polish Case

In this section, we elaborate in more detail on two of our choices with respect to the empirical test. First, we elaborate on why we chose the 2010s as our main period of observation (rather than the 1990s or 2000s). Second, we elaborate on why the success of the PiS as a party represents the best outcome measure in light of our theoretical framework.

We chose the period of the 2010s—rather than the 1990s or early 2000s—as our main observation time because in the preceding two decades the Polish political system was still in a state of flux. During these earlier decades, frequent changes to electoral rules and major national debates about the orientation of the political-economic system meant that the viability of parties and party-citizen interactions were heavily oscillating. For those reasons, until the late 2000s, the Polish party system was not in a state of equilibrium. Instead, it underwent several dramatic changes, with new parties rising, several parties disappearing, and completely new coalitions forming (Markowski, 2006; Millard, 1994). In the 2010s, however, initial debates about the country’s fundamental political-economic and geopolitical orientation had been settled and electoral rules became more stable. Thus, the Polish party system moved closer to a state of relative stability. These circumstances mean that patterns of electoral success by parties in the 2010s are much less likely to be related to idiosyncratic or short-lived factors associated with shifting electoral rules or variation in clarity about party viability.

Against this background, the Polish “Law and Justice” (PiS) party in the 2010s represents a perfect measure of the strength of populist, anti-system parties in line with our theoretical framework. This is because both ideologically and practically its antidemocratic orientation was clear to observers of Polish politics. For instance, Charnysh (2017) describes how the party did not condemn—and thus often implicitly legitimized—extremist right-wing political positions. Among others, she also points to a growing radicalization of the PiS party elite in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

This radicalization of the PiS was not limited to rhetoric or superficial displays of antidemocratic positions. Instead, once the party had gained political power in the mid-2010s, it very actively sought to dismantle Poland’s democratic system of checks and balances. Specifically, it not only disempowered the Constitutional Tribunal—one of Poland’s most important judicial institutions at the federal level—to remove a possible (democratically and legitimately instituted) veto player to its legislative goals (Sadurski, 2019, chap. 3), but also shaped the entire rest of the justice system in accordance with its own partisan interests, concentrating an enormous amount of legal (and political) power (Sadurski, 2019, chap. 4). These actions were accompanied by assaults on a whole host of other institutions that are central to functioning democracies, including the Polish media system, a viable political opposition, and a neutral civil service (Sadurski, 2019, chap. 5).

Accordingly, the assessments of scholars have been extremely critical and indicate a severe form of democratic backsliding. Drinóczy and Bień-Kacała (2019) think of the developments in Poland at this time as the emergence of “illiberal constitutionalism”—a process that includes the relativization and undermining of democratic principles. Similarly, Markowski (2019) suggests that the PiS created a form of “authoritarian clientelism,” which is at odds with the principles of liberal democracy and the rule of law. All of these arguments show that the PiS was not only a perceived, but a real threat to democracy.

Despite the aforementioned developments, [Nalepa \(2021\)](#) presents evidence that suggests that there was some degree of uncertainty on the part of many Polish citizens regarding the authoritarian tendencies of the PiS. Importantly, this argument and evidence do not represent a direct contradiction to our theory. After all, PiS was and is a fundamentally populist party (with the strength of populism being a key consequence of the suppression of self-government). Populist parties typically do not have a strong commitment to democratic and/or constitutional norms, making them at least a *potential* threat to democracy. In line with our framework, the inability of citizens to clearly recognize such a potential threat and to allow for its political leaders to rise to power can be seen to at least in part be related to previous (enduring) episodes of the suppression of self-government (via the mechanisms outlined by us above). Indeed, that using more aggressive political rhetoric and borrowing from extreme agendas both represent potential threats to democracy was known long before PiS received the opportunity to dismantle Poland’s constitutional system (see, for instance, [Rupnik, 2007, 24](#)). In line with this anticipation, exclusionary identity politics (rhetoric) became a key component of (justifying) democratic backsliding in Poland ([Sata and Karolewski, 2020](#)).<sup>3</sup>

Based on our framework in the main body of the study and our comprehensive analysis of the historical background of the Polish case (see [subsection A.2](#)), we predict that the Law and Justice (PiS) party should be strongest in areas that experienced the most severe suppression of self-government and had the least experience with democratic participation. In the comparison of Prussia and Russia, the Russian areas clearly were subject to more militarized, repressive foreign rule that also did not have any truly democratic components that could serve as the template for self-governance processes. While Prussian rule also had some (albeit more limited) repressive elements, it was generally much more constrained and offered the Poles significantly more robust channels for political participation, including full voting rights for males above the age of 25 as of the year 1871.<sup>4</sup>

## A.4 Descriptive Statistics: Poland

[Table A1](#) shows descriptive statistics for the Polish case.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Poland

Variable	n	Min	q <sub>1</sub>	$\bar{x}$	$\tilde{x}$	q <sub>3</sub>	Max	IQR
Mayor PiS (2014–2018)	2445	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Mayor PiS (Broad) (2014–2018)	2445	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Mayor PiS (2010–2014)	2448	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Russia	2448	0.00	0.00	0.44	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Interwar Germany	2448	0.00	0.00	0.26	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Austria	2448	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Elevation	2448	-2.49	105.49	186.25	155.57	228.27	1207.07	122.78
Pop. Density	2448	4.37	41.46	221.12	64.08	129.04	3991.21	87.58
Urban Share	2448	0.00	0.00	24.20	0.00	46.98	100.00	46.98
Unemployment Rate	2448	0.97	3.45	5.43	4.87	7.02	18.17	3.57
Avg. Monthly Salary (%)	2448	65.40	77.20	83.50	81.45	87.10	166.00	9.90
Working Age. Pop. Share	2448	46.90	61.00	62.08	62.10	63.20	68.60	2.20
Elderly Pop. Share	2448	10.80	17.10	19.25	19.10	21.10	40.70	4.00
Population (Log.) (2014)	2448	7.20	8.52	9.08	8.93	9.48	14.37	0.96
Population (Log.) (2010)	2448	7.22	8.53	9.09	8.93	9.47	14.35	0.94

## A.5 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Further Information on the Underlying Dataset—Relevant Polish Counties

With respect to Poland, for historical reasons, we exclude a number of municipalities from our geographic regression discontinuity analysis. Specifically, we exclude all territories that historically belonged to interwar Germany. The reason for us to remove this set of observations is that, after World War II, a massive population resettlement took place. Many Poles from the easternmost and southern parts of Poland were forced to relocate to the west. As a part of this process, they were resettled into the former territories of Germany (while the previous German inhabitants of these areas fled to the west or were forcibly removed). Given these massive population resettlements ([Charnysh, 2019](#); [Charnysh and Peisakhin, 2022](#)), we cannot treat the areas of interwar Germany in the same way as the parts that belonged to interwar Prussia. Thus, we have excluded them from our geographic regression discontinuity analysis. This decision is visualized in [Figure A2](#).


## A.6 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Further Information on the Geographic Regression Discontinuity Models

In this section, we provide the explicit mathematical functions that we use to measure the geographic location of Polish municipalities in the different versions of our GRDD.

<sup>3</sup>On this issue, see also [Charnysh \(2017\)](#).

<sup>4</sup>Furthermore, as we discuss in more detail below, the Austrian case does not allow for a straightforward prediction due to the ambiguous/shifting character of Austrian rule over time.

Figure A2: Map of the Data Used in Our Analysis



Note: This map shows the municipalities that are included in our GRDD regressions. Only green municipalities were included in those regressions; blue municipalities were excluded for the reasons described above.

**Distance to Border:**

$$f(\text{geographic location}) = \gamma_1 \text{ distance to border}_i + \gamma_2 \text{ distance to border}_i * EMP_{ji} \quad (1)$$

Distance to the border is measured in km, with negative values denoting one empire in a pairwise comparison, positive values denoting another one. Coefficients of the distance terms are represented by  $\gamma$ .

**Distance to Border with Second-Order Polynomial:**

$$f(\text{geographic location}) = \gamma_1 \text{ distance to border}_i + \gamma_2 \text{ distance to border}_i^2 + \gamma_3 \text{ distance to border}_i * EMP_{ji} + \gamma_4 \text{ distance to border}_i^2 * EMP_{ji} \quad (2)$$

Distance to the border is again measured in km, with negative values denoting one empire in a pairwise comparison, positive values denoting another one. Coefficients of the distance terms are again represented by  $\gamma$ .

**Distance to Border with Latitude and Longitude:**

$$f(\text{geographic location}) = \gamma_1 x + \gamma_2 y + \gamma_3 \text{ distance to border}_i + \gamma_4 \text{ distance to border}_i * EMP_{ji} \quad (3)$$

In this regression format,  $x$  stands for latitude and  $y$  stands for longitude. Coefficients are again represented by  $\gamma$ .

**A.7 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Additional Results**

The following tables and figures complement the discussion of the results in the main body of the paper. Table A2 shows the regression results of our Prussia/Russia comparison with a number of covariates included. Figure A3 and Figure A4 represent additional RDD graphs of the alternative outcome measures. Finally, Figure A5 and Figure A6 represent additional maps of the alternative outcome measures.

**A.8 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Simple Dummy Variable Analysis**

In the main body of the paper, we presented an empirical comparison of municipalities in the formerly Prussia and Russian partitions that was based on a geographic regression discontinuity design. The key advantage of this approach is that it allows us to rule out alternative explanatory factors that do not jump discontinuously at the critical threshold, which is the imperial border (such as the distance to Russia).

At the same time, in the interest of full transparency, in this appendix section, we also present the results of a simple dummy variable analysis that does not rely on a GRDD and considers the full sample of Polish municipalities. We mainly consider this a robustness check through which we can potentially confirm the general direction of our empirical results with a broader sample.


Table A2: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Prussia/Russia Comparison) (With Controls)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor PIS (4)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (5)	Mayor PIS (2010) (6)
Russia	0.066** (0.028)	0.072** (0.028)	0.050** (0.024)	0.092*** (0.032)	0.102*** (0.033)	0.053* (0.027)
Elevation	-0.00000 (0.0002)	0.00001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Lat.	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)			
Long.	0.011 (0.009)	0.010 (0.010)	0.002 (0.008)			
Pop. Density				0.00004 (0.00003)	0.00004 (0.00003)	0.00000 (0.00002)
Urban Share				0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Unemploy. Rate				-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.003)
Avg. Monthly Salary				0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Work. Age Pop. Share				0.019** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)
Elderly Pop. Share				0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)
Pop. (Log) (2014)				0.004 (0.015)	0.007 (0.015)	
Pop. (Log) (2010)						-0.001 (0.013)
Dist. PR-RU	-0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Russia * Dist. PR-RU	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Constant	-0.003 (0.760)	0.002 (0.781)	-0.248 (0.664)	-1.339** (0.637)	-1.535** (0.652)	0.498 (0.544)
Observations	1,435	1,435	1,437	867	867	868
R <sup>2</sup>	0.020	0.022	0.018	0.037	0.040	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.018	0.014	0.024	0.027	0.009

Note: OLS  
\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A3: GRDD Graph 2: Mayor PIS (Broad)



Note: This figure represents a comparison of the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2014 elections, broad definition) between former Prussian and Russian municipalities in Poland. Municipalities in the former Prussian partition are on the left; municipalities in the former Russian partition are on the right. The line at zero represents the historical border. The x-axis represents municipalities' distance to the historical border. The corresponding regression is model 2 in Table 2 in the main paper.

Figure A4: GRDD Graph 3: Mayor PIS (2010)



Note: This figure represents a comparison of the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2010 elections) between former Prussian and Russian municipalities in Poland. Municipalities in the former Prussian partition are on the left; municipalities in the former Russian partition are on the right. The line at zero represents the historical border. The x-axis represents municipalities' distance to the historical border. The corresponding regression is model 3 in Table 2 in the main paper.

### A.8.1 Additional Independent Variables in the Simple Dummy Variable Analysis

As we present an analysis of the full sample of Polish municipalities here, in addition to a variable for “Russia” and the baseline of “Prussia”, we add two further independent variables:

1. **Austria:** This dummy variable indicates if a municipality historically belonged to the Austrian partition (1815–1914). (Additional results related to Austria (in pairwise GRDD comparisons) are further below, in section A.9.)
2. **Interwar Germany:** This dummy variable indicates if a municipality historically belonged to Interwar Germany (1918–1939). These territories experienced significant population transfers from the formerly Russian partition and from eastern Galicia after World War II (Charnysh, 2019). Thus, they need to be distinguished from other parts of the Prussian partition.<sup>5</sup>


### A.8.2 Models in the Simple Dummy Variable Analysis

This additional empirical test is based on simple dummy variable analyses. The regressions have the following format:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_j EMP_{ji} + \beta_{n+1} ELV_i + \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta} + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$


<sup>5</sup>As shown in Figure A2, these observations are excluded in our geographic regression discontinuity models.

Figure A5: Map of PIS-affiliated Mayors (Broad Definition) in the 2014 Elections



Note: This map shows the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2014 elections, broad definition) across all three partitions of Poland. The Prussian partition is the western one; the Russian partition is the eastern one; the Austrian partition is the southern one.

Figure A6: Map of PIS-affiliated Mayors in the 2010 Elections



Note: This map shows the success of PiS candidates in mayoral elections (2010 elections) across all three partitions of Poland. The Prussian partition is the western one; the Russian partition is the eastern one; the Austrian partition is the southern one.

where  $y_i$  is the dependent variable for municipality  $i$ .  $\beta_j$  represents the difference in the value of the dependent variable between municipalities that belonged to empire (EMP)  $j$  and those that belonged to the baseline category. The baseline category is Prussian municipalities that did not belong to interwar Germany.  $\beta_{j+1}$  is the coefficient for elevation (ELV). Control variables are contained in vector  $\mathbf{x}$ .

### A.8.3 Results

Table A3 and Table A4 show the results of the dummy variable regressions. In the Appendix, we also add control variables. While this introduces the possibility of posttreatment bias, said variables might also have an important independent influence.

As our findings in the main body of the paper, these additional results also confirm that there are significant differences across the partitions in accordance with our expectations. In particular, even when considering the full sample, there is a significantly higher likelihood that municipalities have a PiS-affiliated mayor in the formerly Russian partition when compared to the Prussian partition.

Importantly, as shown in the following Appendix section (subsection A.9), the initial finding presented here that Austria is more likely to have PiS mayors does not hold in some of the more rigorous GRDD regressions. This indicates that underlying geographic patterns and their possible effects on social organization could play a role in explaining the discrepancy.



Table A3: Local Political Leadership Outcomes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mayor PIS	Mayor PIS (Broad)	Mayor PIS (2010)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Russia	0.080*** (0.015)	0.087*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.012)
Interwar Germany	0.006 (0.016)	0.008 (0.017)	0.005 (0.014)
Austria	0.112*** (0.019)	0.123*** (0.019)	0.053*** (0.015)
Constant	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)
Observations	2,445	2,445	2,448
R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.031	0.020
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027	0.030	0.019

Note: OLS \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (With Controls)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mayor PIS	Mayor PIS (Broad)	Mayor PIS (2010)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Russia	0.111*** (0.017)	0.119*** (0.017)	0.088*** (0.014)
Interwar Germany	0.017 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	0.018 (0.015)
Austria	0.146*** (0.022)	0.157*** (0.023)	0.054*** (0.018)
Elevation	-0.0001** (0.00005)	-0.0001** (0.00005)	0.00004 (0.00004)
Pop. Density	0.00004** (0.00002)	0.00004** (0.00002)	0.00003* (0.00001)
Urban Share	0.0005** (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Unemply. Rate	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Avg. Monthly Salary	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.0005)
Work. Age Pop. Share	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Elderly Pop. Share	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Pop. (Log) (2014)	0.001 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)	
Pop. (Log) (2010)			0.001 (0.008)
Constant	-0.155 (0.328)	-0.213 (0.339)	0.285 (0.272)
Observations	2,445	2,445	2,448
R <sup>2</sup>	0.044	0.047	0.029
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.040	0.043	0.025

Note: OLS \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## A.9 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Results of Comparisons with Austria

In the main body of the study we have omitted the pairwise (GRDD) comparisons of Prussia/Austria and Austria/Russia. We have done this because the classification of the Austrian case is more ambiguous due to the shifting character of Austrian rule over time. As explained in some more detail above (subsection A.2), Austria’s rule initially was highly oppressive, but later adopted a more participatory style in administrative affairs. Nevertheless, Austria only introduced full democratic participation in federal elections very late (in 1907), meaning that it might not have had a profound long-term impact on the dynamics discussed by us. Finally, socioeconomic structures and the urban landscape might differ to an extent in the Austrian partition that an effective comparison with Prussia and Russia is more difficult (Charasz, 2021). For these reasons, in the main body of the study we focus on the distinction between Prussia and Russia.

Despite these important points, we include the results of the additional comparisons for full transparency below.

### A.9.1 Austria/Russia Comparison

Table A5 includes the main GRDD results for the Austria/Russia comparison without control variables. The results highly depend on specification and can therefore be classified as inconclusive. The initial results no longer show any level of significance when alternative DVs or second-order polynomials of distance are used.

Table A6 includes additional results for the Austria/Russia comparison with the latitude/longitude specification and control variables. In many cases, the significance of the key variable depends on model specification, making the initial results fragile.

Overall, these findings highlight the more ambiguous character of Austrian rule in the southern partition of Poland. Specifically, the results clearly show that this ambivalent character of Austrian rule did not produce a coherent legacy that differs from the long-term effects of Prussian or Russian rule in a consistent way.

### A.9.2 Prussia/Austria Comparison

Table A7 includes the main GRDD results for the Prussia/Austria comparison without control variables. Similar to the Austria/Russia comparison, the initial results are not confirmed by the more complex models.

Table A8 includes additional results for the Prussia/Austria comparison with the latitude/longitude specification and control variables. Once additional covariates are introduced, the results are no longer significant.

Similar to the previous Austria/Russia comparison, the results remain inconclusive. This may be partly related to the smaller sample size that is available to us (when it comes to the analysis of Austrian municipalities), but it may also be a long-term outcome of the more ambiguous and changing character of Austrian rule in Galicia (the southern partition of Poland).

## A.10 Empirical Examination (Case 1) Supplement: Mayors with Higher Education

One of our paper’s theoretical claims is about the cultural values that parents instill in their children as a consequence of severe and long episodes of the suppression of self-government. Specifically, those kinds of suppression episodes in particular reduce the likelihood of parents emphasizing cultural values related to self-efficacy, professionalism, and egalitarianism in their children’s upbringing. Instead, our theory suggests that parents in these contexts tend to emphasize cultural values related to authoritarianism/populism and beliefs in hierarchical social orders.

As touched upon in the main body of the paper, with respect to the case of Poland, there are already multiple pieces of empirical evidence that suggest that values related to self-efficacy, professionalism, and egalitarianism are significantly more prevalent in the formerly Prussian parts of Poland when compared to the formerly Russian parts (for details, see Hryniewicz, 1996; Vogler, 2019).

Additionally, in Table A9, we present new empirical evidence showing that municipalities in the formerly Russian parts of Poland are significantly less likely to have mayors with higher education when compared to the formerly Prussian partition. Building on the literature that connects self-efficacy and educational attainment (e.g., Ayllón, Alsina and Colomer, 2019; Grabowski, Call and Mortimer, 2001; Schunk, 1989) and the literature that connects populism and distrust in experts and higher education (e.g., Merkley, 2020; Read, 2018), we suggest that these novel results are indicative of differences in the aforementioned cultural dimensions in line with our argument.

Overall, the combination of insights from the literature and these new results supports the notion that variation in imperial rule led to major differences in cultural values across the partitions that are still observable today.

## A.11 First Case Supplement: Proximity to Russia as an Alternative Explanation

Our findings reveal a clear empirical pattern: Municipalities in the formerly Russian partition of Poland are much more likely to have a PiS-affiliated or PiS-endorsed mayor than municipalities in the formerly Prussian partition. From the perspective of our theoretical framework, these patterns can be linked to differences in the character of the historical suppression of self-government between these major imperial powers.

Table A5: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Austria/Russia Comparison)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor PIS (4)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (5)	Mayor PIS (2010) (6)
Russia	-0.075** (0.037)	-0.085** (0.038)	0.039 (0.031)	-0.102* (0.053)	-0.103* (0.055)	0.003 (0.045)
Elevation	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)
Dist. AU-RU	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.00002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Dist. AU-RU Sq.				-0.000002 (0.00002)	-0.000002 (0.00002)	-0.000001 (0.00002)
Russia * Dist. AU-RU	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.00002 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Russia*Dist. AU-RU Sq.				0.00002 (0.00002)	0.00002 (0.00002)	0.00001 (0.00002)
Constant	0.230*** (0.035)	0.253*** (0.036)	0.062** (0.030)	0.265*** (0.048)	0.281*** (0.049)	0.084** (0.040)
Observations	1,420	1,420	1,422	1,420	1,420	1,422
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.011	0.002	0.010	0.012	0.003
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.008	-0.0004	0.006	0.008	-0.001

Note: OLS  
\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A6: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Austria/Russia Comparison) (With Controls)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor HE (4)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (6)
Russia	-0.082** (0.038)	-0.089** (0.039)	0.031 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.051 (0.053)
Elevation	-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)
Lat.	0.010 (0.057)	-0.015 (0.059)	0.053 (0.048)		
Long.	0.009 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)		
Pop. Density				0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Urban Share				0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0005)
Unemploy. Rate				-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Avg. Monthly Salary				-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Work. Age Pop. Share				-0.004 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.009)
Elderly Pop. Share				-0.010 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)
Pop. (Log) (2014)				0.029 (0.025)	0.050* (0.026)
Pop. (Log) (2010)					0.006 (0.021)
Dist. AU-RU	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Russia * Dist. AU-RU	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Constant	-0.491 (2.751)	0.722 (2.835)	-2.524 (2.307)	0.553 (0.819)	0.833 (0.848)
Observations	1,420	1,420	1,422	710	711
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.014	0.003	0.035	0.022
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.008	0.009	-0.001	0.020	0.006

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A7: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Prussia/Austria Comparison)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor PIS (4)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (5)	Mayor PIS (2010) (6)
Austria	0.116*** (0.042)	0.127*** (0.044)	0.062** (0.031)	0.043 (0.052)	0.054 (0.054)	0.038 (0.038)
Elevation	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.00005 (0.0001)
Dist. PR-AU	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)	0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.00004 (0.0002)
Dist. PR-AU Sq.				-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Austria * Dist. PR-AU	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.00005 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Russia*Dist. PR-AU Sq.				-0.00000* (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)
Constant	0.070** (0.035)	0.077** (0.036)	0.010 (0.025)	0.100*** (0.042)	0.108*** (0.044)	0.009 (0.031)
Observations	729	729	729	729	729	729
R <sup>2</sup>	0.075	0.085	0.023	0.082	0.091	0.026
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.070	0.079	0.018	0.074	0.084	0.018

Note: OLS  
\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A8: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Prussia/Austria Comparison) (With Controls)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Mayor PIS (1)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (2)	Mayor PIS (2010) (3)	Mayor HE (4)	Mayor PIS (5)	Mayor PIS (Broad) (6)
Austria	0.113*** (0.044)	0.123*** (0.045)	0.050 (0.032)	0.092 (0.065)	0.099 (0.068)	0.045 (0.056)
Elevation	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
Lat.	0.129** (0.065)	0.111* (0.066)	-0.074 (0.047)			
Long.	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.027* (0.014)			
Pop. Density				0.00002 (0.00005)	0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.00004)
Urban Share				0.0002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Unemploy. Rate				-0.017 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.015)
Avg. Monthly Salary				0.0002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)
Work. Age Pop. Share				-0.019 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	0.008 (0.015)
Elderly Pop. Share				-0.020* (0.012)	-0.022* (0.012)	0.00004 (0.010)
Pop. (Log) (2014)				-0.015 (0.029)	0.00002 (0.030)	
Pop. (Log) (2010)						0.014 (0.025)
Dist. PR-AU	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)
Austria * Dist. PR-AU	-0.001 (0.0005)	-0.001 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Constant	-6.144** (3.006)	-5.317* (3.096)	3.216 (2.185)	1.698 (1.260)	1.745 (1.318)	-0.609 (1.074)
Observations	729	729	729	191	191	191
R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.089	0.028	0.051	0.051	0.026
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.073	0.082	0.020	-0.008	-0.007	-0.034

Note: OLS  
\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A9: Local Political Leadership Outcomes (Extension: Mayor with Higher Education)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mayor with Higher Education		
	Simple Dummy Variables (1)	Regression Discontinuity Design (2 & 3)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Russia	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.053* (0.029)	-0.079** (0.039)
Interwar Germany	-0.047** (0.019)		
Austria	-0.052** (0.022)		
Elevation		-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0002* (0.0001)
Dist. PR-RU		-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.001)
Dist. PR-RU Sq.			-0.00000 (0.00001)
Russia*Dist.		0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.001)
Russia*Dist. Sq.			0.00000 (0.00001)
Constant	0.954*** (0.015)	0.978*** (0.031)	0.984*** (0.040)
Observations	2,445	1,435	1,435
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.013	0.014
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.010	0.010

Note: OLS \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

However, a possible alternative explanation is that geographic proximity to Russia is (partly) responsible for the observed dynamics. Geographic proximity to Russia could (potentially) make it more likely that authoritarian cultural values prevalent in the Russian Empire (and later the Soviet Union) diffuse and influence culture in Poland, especially in the eastern parts of the country.

Although this explanation is plausible at first glance, there are two key reasons why it is not a sufficient or strong alternative explanation for the patterns observed by us.

The first and most important reason is that our analysis largely relies on a geographic regression discontinuity design (GRDD) through which we identify a discontinuous jump in key outcome variables at the historical imperial border between Prussia and Russia. The alternative explanation of proximity to Russia would only be a viable alternative account if distance to Russia would also jump discontinuously at the threshold, which it does not. Accordingly, our research design allows us to rule out this alternative explanation.

In addition to the above—mostly technical—reason, the influence of Russian cultural values would be a much stronger possible alternative account if it was not for the extreme and persistent historical (political and cultural) antagonism between Poles and Russians (Davies, 2005). In fact, even when Russia ruled large parts of Poland, the Poles generally considered Russians to be culturally inferior (Weeks, 1994). This rejection of Russia, especially Russian culture and political influence, persisted throughout the post-imperial period. Among others, it was visible in the fact that Poland had one of the strongest anti-Soviet political movements in the eastern bloc in the form of “Solidarność” (Solidarity) (Kubow, 2013). The historian Timothy Garton Ash goes as far as to say that “the Polish national identity is historically defined *in opposition to Russia*” (Ash, 1991, 5, emphasis added).<sup>6</sup> For these reasons, cultural and political influences of Russia or the diffusion of values as a result of proximity are also not a strong alternative explanation from a substantive perspective.

In sum, proximity to Russia is not a strong alternative explanation for the observed geographic divergence in electoral outcomes for two main reasons. First, from a purely technical perspective, there is not a discontinuous jump in proximity to Russia at the critical threshold in our regression discontinuity design. Second, from a substantive-historical perspective, proximity to Russia as a source of cultural or political diffusion is not a strong alternative explanation due to the forceful and persistent rejection of Russian influence by the Polish people.

## A.12 Second Case Supplement: Extended Information on the Historical Background


In this section, we provide additional information about the Brazilian case.

### A.12.1 The Municipalities with Appointed Mayors

Figure A7 shows the municipalities of our 1988 sample and Figure A8 shows the municipalities of our 1992 sample. Please note that data availability was slightly higher for 1992 than 1988, which is the main reason for a minor divergence in the number of observations between the two time periods.


<sup>6</sup>Also cited in Kubow (2013, 5).

Figure A7: Map of the Municipalities with Appointed Mayors (1988)



Note: This map shows the municipalities of Brazil in 1988. The green dots represent municipalities that did not previously have appointed mayors (“Intervened” = 0). The red dots represent municipalities that had appointed mayors under the authoritarian regime (“Intervened” = 1).

Figure A8: Map of the Municipalities with Appointed Mayors (1992)



Note: This map shows the municipalities of Brazil in 1992. The green dots represent municipalities that did not previously have appointed mayors (“Intervened” = 0). The red dots represent municipalities that had appointed mayors under the authoritarian regime (“Intervened” = 1).


### A.12.2 Vote Shares for João Goulart in the 1960s

As discussed in the main body of the study, it is important for us to account for the political orientation of a municipality prior to the authoritarian regime (as this may influence the likelihood of intervention). In this respect we chose the vote share for



João Goulart in the 1960 vice-presidential election as a strong proxy. Figure A9 shows its distribution between the two types of municipalities, indicating that this is not a strong explanatory factor for intervention.

Figure A9: Vote Shares for João Goulart in the 1960 Vice-Presidential Election



Note: These box plots show two sets of comparisons of the vote share for João Goulart. The first part of the plot (on the left) includes the full sample, the second part of the plot (on the right) excludes state capitals. In each part, the comparison is between municipalities that did not previously have appointed mayors (“Intervened” = 0) and municipalities that had appointed mayors under the authoritarian regime (“Intervened” = 1). The plots indicate that there was no ideological selection of municipalities, ruling out an important possible form of omitted variable bias.

### A.13 Descriptive Statistics: Brazil

Table A10 shows descriptive statistics for the case of Brazil.

Table A10: Descriptive Statistics: Brazil

Variable	n	Min	q <sub>1</sub>	$\bar{x}$	$\tilde{x}$	q <sub>3</sub>	Max	IQR
PDS Mayor (1988)	4349	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
PDS Mayor (1992)	4923	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
PFL Mayor (1988)	4349	0.00	0.00	0.28	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
PFL Mayor (1992)	4923	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Intervention	4930	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Mineral Water	4930	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Distance (Log.)	4923	-0.92	6.07	6.55	6.87	7.39	7.74	1.32
Population (Log.) (1996)	4923	6.64	8.64	9.42	9.34	10.03	16.10	1.39
Human Development (1991)	4923	0.36	0.53	0.62	0.64	0.70	0.85	0.17


### A.14 Drivers of Intervention

Since our empirical strategy is based on knowledge of the factors that drove the military government’s mayoral appointments, here we provide evidence that these factors were indeed strongly associated with the suppression of local self-rule. To that end, we estimate a logistic regression in which we regress *Intervened* onto the four covariates described above. We then plot average predictive comparisons (APCs) (Gelman and Pardoe, 2007) for the covariates to depict the influence of each on the likelihood of intervention.

Figure A10 presents the findings. For *Mineral Water*, the APC was calculated as the average predicted change in the probability of intervention due to all municipalities being assigned a value of 1 instead of 0 on this variable. For the remaining covariates (which are continuous), the APCs were calculated as the average predicted changes in the probability of intervention due to all municipalities being assigned a value equal to the 95th percentile on a given covariate instead of the 5th percentile. As seen in the figure, in all cases the APCs were statistically significant. Most striking was the influence of *Distance to Border (Log.)*: A change from the 5th percentile of this variable to the 95th percentile leads to an increase in the likelihood

of intervention of approximately 24 percentage points. The impact of *Mineral Water* was also substantial, leading to a 8–9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of intervention. The associations of population and human development with intervention were generally weaker, with the former being positively associated with intervention and the latter negatively associated with it.

Figure A10: Impact of Covariates on the Likelihood of Intervention (Logistic Regression)



Note: Shown are average predictive comparisons (APCs) (Gelman and Pardoe, 2007). For the binary covariate (*Mineral Water*), the APC shown is the average predicted change in the probability of intervention due to all municipalities being assigned a value of 1 instead of 0. For the continuous covariates, the APCs shown are the average predicted changes in probability due to all municipalities being assigned a value equal to the 95th percentile instead of the 5th percentile. Detailed results for all underlying regressions can be found in Table A9 in the Appendix.

## A.15 Second Case Supplement: Full Regression Tables for the Analysis of the Brazilian Case

This subsection contains detailed regression tables for all figures located in the paper. Specifically, Table A11 shows the results associated with Figure A10, Table A12 and Table A13 show the results associated with Figure 4, and Table A14 shows the results associated with Figure 5.

Table A11: Logistic Regression of Municipal Intervention on Covariates (Figure A10 in the Appendix)

	(1)	(2)
Distance-to-border	-1.213*** (0.063)	-1.246*** (0.065)
Mineral Water	1.549*** (0.212)	1.836*** (0.230)
Population (log.)	0.665*** (0.072)	0.398*** (0.005)
Human Development	-4.149*** (1.050)	-5.051*** (1.111)
<i>N</i>	4,921	4,890
Capitals Included?	Y	N

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*90% confidence level, \*\*95% confidence level, \*\*\*99% confidence level.

Table A12: Linear Probability Model with State Fixed Effects (w/ Controls) (Figure 4, Part 1 in the Main Paper)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<u>PDS Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PDS Mayor, 1992</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1992</u>	
Intervened	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.029)	0.015 (0.038)	0.017 (0.040)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.006 (0.032)	0.026 (0.034)
Distance-to-border	-0.016* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)	0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.014* (0.007)	0.004 (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)
Mineral Water	-0.010 (0.018)	0.011 (0.019)	0.012 (0.025)	0.011 (0.026)	0.022 (0.016)	0.021 (0.016)	0.003 (0.022)	0.002 (0.023)
Population (log.)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.006)
Human Development	0.189* (0.108)	0.185* (0.109)	0.008 (0.149)	0.002 (0.150)	-0.013 (0.085)	-0.002 (0.086)	0.019 (0.122)	0.050 (0.123)
N	4,327	4,301	4,327	4,301	4,914	4,883	4,914	4,883
Capitals Included?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*90% confidence level, \*\*95% confidence level, \*\*\*99% confidence level.

Table A13: Linear Probability Model with State Fixed Effects (w/o Controls) (Figure 4, Part 2 in the Main Paper)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<u>PDS Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PDS Mayor, 1992</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1992</u>	
Intervened	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.033)	-0.000 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.028)	0.008 (0.029)
N	4,349	4,323	4,349	4,323	4,923	4,892	4,923	4,892
Capitals Included?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*90% confidence level, \*\*95% confidence level, \*\*\*99% confidence level.

Table A14: Coarsened Exact Matching, Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (Figure 5 in the Main Paper)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<u>PDS Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1988</u>		<u>PDS Mayor, 1992</u>		<u>PFL Mayor, 1992</u>	
ATT (Intervened)	-0.025 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.045 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.028)	0.010 (0.030)
N.treated-all	212	186	212	186	266	235	266	235
N.treated-matched	166	149	166	149	205	183	205	183
N.controls-all	4,115	4,115	4,115	4,115	4,648	4,648	4,648	4,648
N.controls-matched	1,224	1,122	1,224	1,123	1,497	1,388	1,497	1,388
Capitals Included?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*90% confidence level, \*\*95% confidence level, \*\*\*99% confidence level.

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